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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the evolution, and theoretical basis
of the United States' maritime strategy in the North
Atlantic and what is referred to as "NATO's Northern Flank."
The strategy associated with past Secretary of the Navy,
John Lehman, is no longer considered applicable in the
context of today's East-West relationship and is in need of
reassessment. The paper then assesses the current, post
Cold War situation and looks at future security interests
the United States may have in the region. Additionally, the
security and defense capabilities of our allies in the
region are examined. Given the United States will remain
closely linked with European security issues, by examining
the successes and failures of past strategies and the
strengths and weaknesses of our allies, one will be better
able to develop a new strategy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE
This study examines the history, theoretical evolution
and future security requirements of the United States'
maritime strategy in the North Atlantic and what is referred
to as "NATO's Northern Flank."1' (see Figure: 1) The strategy
associated with past Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, is
no longer considered applicable in the context of today's
East-West relationship and is in need of reassessment. 2 The
paper then looks at current and future security interests
the United States may have in the region and what past
lessons, if any, can be applied to a new strategy.
'For purposes of this thesis, "NATO's Northern Flank"
will be the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. Although Finland and Sweden
are not members of the Alliance, their political and
military posture is important to Western security interest.
2Carlisle A.H. Trost, "Maritime Strategy for the 1990s,
United States Naval Institute Proceedings (hereafter
referred to as Proceedings) (Naval Review 1990), p. 92.
B. BACKGROUND
The middle 1970s through the early 1980s saw a
renaissance in United States military and strategic
thinking. This was in response to five major factors: the
post-Vietnam era with its declining naval force structure;
perceived Soviet expansionism into what once had been areas
of Western European and American interest; increasing global
Soviet naval presence; domestic and international
questioning of American strength and resolve; and a period
of declining budgets for defense acquisitions under the
Nixon and the Carter administrations. Spearheaded by
influential leaders within the Department of the Navy, and
based in part on the philosophical foundations of Alfred
Thayer Mahan's masterwork, The Influence of Sea Power upon
History, 1660-1783, the strategic concept that became known
as the "Maritime Strategy" was developed and implemented.3
This concept served as a guide for U.S. naval operations
3By the late-1980s, the term "Maritime Strategy" fell
into disuse in politico-military circles as the Navy began
stressing the joint military requirements of a National
Strategy. The preferred terminology became "the maritime
component of the National Military Strategy" as coined by
then Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James D. Watkins, in
the Supplement to U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
(hereinafter cited as gdilg), January 1986, pp. 2-17.
The term "Maritime Strategy has several pseudonyms: the
Forward Maritime Strategy [FMS], and "the maritime component
of the National Military Strategy".
2
worldwide from 1983 until the end of the decade.4  The Navy
did not formulate this strategy in isolation; it had to
confer closely with its allies to ensure success. Given
however that the U.S. Navy is the largest component element
of Western naval power, the Maritime Strategy has had a
profound impact on operations and policy in these countries,
especially the Nordic members of NATO and Great Britain.5
Since the Reagan presidency the world has witnessed
enormous changes. The old bi-polar alignment of the United
States against the Soviet Union has faded and Mikhail
Gorbachev's Glasnost and Perestroika seem to be the long
sought after turn around of domestic and international
4A tremendous amount of literature exist on the
formulation of the "Maritime Strategy". Probably the best
listing of the professional debates that occurred is Captain
Peter M. Swartz's "Contemporary U.S. Naval Strategy: A
Bibliography," Supplement to U.S. Naval Institute
Proceeings, pp. 41-7, and his "1986 Addendum" in the same
journal, January 1986.
OFor an analysis of the impact of the Maritime Strategy
on the Far North see Rodney Kennedy-Minott, U.S. Regional
Force Application: The Maritime Strategy and Its Effect on
Nordic Stability (Hoover Institute: Stanford University,
1988), 1-49.; John C. Ausland, Nordic Security and the
Great Powers (Bolder, CO: Westview Press, 1986); Eric
Grove, ed. NATO's Defense of the North (London: Brassey's,
1988); and Ola Tunander, Cold Water Politics (London: SAGE
Publications, 1989). NATO's three major military commands
(Tri-MNC), Europe (SACEUR), Atlantic (SACLANT), and English
Channel (CINCCHAN) developed a concept of Maritime
operations in the 1980s (Tri-MNC CONMAROPS), that is closely
patterned after the Lehman strategy and is the plan NATO
would use in the event of crisis or hostilities.
3
Soviet policy. The Western world celebrated as one Soviet
satellite after another forsake Communism and declared
interest in the tenets of Capitalism. The Warsaw Pact
Treaty Organization (WPTO) disintegrated before the eyes of
the world. After living with the Cold War for over forty
years, the West eagerly embraced this beginning of a new
spirit of cooperation between the superpowers. The alliance
of Western powers, especially the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), seems to have performed the function
for which its was founded, i.e. to prevent Soviet expansion
and domination, especially in Western Europe. NATO member
countries have begun to question the need for maintaining
strong defenses and are eagerly awaiting the "peace
dividend." There appears to be a period of inward searching
on both sides of the Atlantic. American and European
politicians, no longer feeling the threat of Soviet
adventurism, have announced reduced spending on defense and
a shift of national efforts to domestic problems. President
Bush, in a speech given at the Aspen Institute Symposium on
2 August 1990, called for a twenty five percent cut in U.S.
defense forces by 1995.6 The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
6New York Times, 3 August 1990, p. A13(W) and The
Washington Times, 3 August 1990, p. A7. It is unfo-cunate
that this speech did not receive much attention at the time,
but on the same date of President Bush's speech Iraq's
4
(JCS) have begun planning for regional conflicts and a
reconstitution policy that can deal with a resurgent Soviet
military, if necessary.7
Critics of the policy have questioned the West's ability
to reconstitute its high technology systems such as
submarines, aircraft and modern warships and that perhaps
such a policy is premature.8  The Soviet military appears
unwilling to surrender their power base, threatening recent
achievements in arms control. 9  ENew York Times, 6 February
1991, p. Al.] The turmoil in the Baltic States has resulted
in questioning who is truly in charge in the Soviet Union:
forces invaded the tiny nation of Kawait, thus drawing
international attention to events in the Persian Gulf for
the next seven months.
7See: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1991 Joint Military Net
A snt (JMNA), (Pentagon: Office of Public Information).
The "Reconstitution Strategy" as the proposed policy is know
was discussed at some length during the Cook Conference
(CINCs Planning Conference) held at the Naval Postgraduate
School, 5-7 March 1991. The strategy envisions four forces:
strategic nuclear force that is increasing sea-based and
modernized; an Atlantic force that is a heavy force,
principally land oriented to respond to high intensity
conflicts in Europe, Africa, and S.W. Asia; a Pacific force
that is principally a maritime force; and a Contingency
force that is a tailored mix of mobile, flexible forces (AF,
USN & Army) designed to respond to unexpected and
unpredicted future crisis.
8James J. Tritten, "America's New National Security
Strategy," Submarine Review (April 1991), pp. 15-24.
"Michael R. Gordon, "Outlook is Cloudy for Arms Deal by
U.S. and Soviets," New York Times, 6 February 1991, p.
AI(W).
5
the politicians or the military. Can the strife there
threaten the stability of the rest of Europe and can the
U.S. Navy plan accordingly?
The position the United States Navy finds itself in
today is very much like that of the mid-1970s. Although not
in the post-Vietnam soul searching mode, the call for
reduced military expenditures and reductions in manpo,'r,
while maintaining global commitments, seems to be a case of
d vu. The time is now for the Navy to seize the
initiative and plan for the next decade and beyond and, in
the process, define its mission within the context of a
national strategy. The revival of strategic maritime
thinking that is synonymous with the formulation of the
"Lehman Maritime Strategy" should not be allowed to fall
into neglect. The philosophical underpinnings of the
strategy are by design flexible enough to allow for global
change and incorporation into a joint defense policy that
meets the goals set by the President, Congress, and the
American people.
To ensure such planning is comprehensive and based on
sound judgement, the naval strategist must have a firm
foundation regarding the geostrategic importance of the
Nordic countries to U.S. security policy. The following
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II. POST WORLD WAR TWO GEO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS ON
NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK
A. BACKGROUND
As noted in the introduction, the Soviet Union has
undergone a tremendous amount of change since 1986.
President Gorbachev's sweeping reforms and era of openness,
Glasnost, have decreased tensions between the Superpowers.
The events in Eastern Europe since November 1989, have been
phenomenal. No one would have predicted that the Soviet
Union would release its satellite states so quick'.y and
without bloodshed. Europeans are beginning to believe that
the fear of a super power confrontation they have lived with
since the end of the Second World War is now a thing of the
past.
Nowhere is this more welcomed perhaps, than in the
Scandinavian countries where due to geography, they have
been caught between the struggles of the superpowers. This
has led to unique relations with both superpowers following
World War II. To envision the future, one must first have a
sound understanding of the geo-political developments in the
region. This knowledge combined with ongoing events in the
Soviet Union, Europe, and the United States will be major
factors for developing of a "Northern Flank" for the future.
8
B. SOVIET-SCANDINAVIAN COLD WAR POLICY
1. Soviet-Finnish Policy
The end of the Second World War found Finland in a
unique and disadvantaged situation compared to the other
Scandinavian countries. It first fought on the side of the
Axis powers in retaliation for the Soviet- Finnish Winter
War of 1940. Then, under the terms of the truce signed in
1944, Finland decisively turned against the Nazis and routed
them from the country. It is probably this quick action
against their former allies that saved Finns from the fate
of the other Soviet occupied countries of Europe; they were
the only former German ally in Europe to escape occupation
by the Allies. Also, of all the Soviet Union's World War II
foes, Helsinki was the only European enemy capital the Red
Army failed to capture.
The terms of the truce and the peace treaty that
followed required Finland to:
...recognize the treaty of 1940. The Porkkala area,
380 square kilometers to the southwest of Helsinki, was
to be leased to Soviet Union for fifty years. Petsamo
in the north would be turned over to the U.S.S.R.
Finland's armed forces were to be radically limited and
$300 million were to be paid in war reparations.
Finland agreed to cooperate with the Allies (in effect
the Soviet Union) in detaining and sentencing persons
9
guilty of war crimes and in breaking up all
organizations of a "fascist nature.' 0
The stubborn Finnish government, although still
independent, was almost absorbed into the Soviet Empire.
Evidence of this comes from records of the second truce
meeting held between Molotov and the Finnish prime minister,
Hachzell in May 1944." ±  Milovan Djilas, the well know
Yugoslav communist, who later fell out of favor with the
Party, reports that Stalin remembered that less than four
million Finns inflicted one million casualties on the
Soviets form 1939-1941, and had a healthy respect for the
Finns.* 2  Under Soviet leadership an Allied Control
Commission was set up to oversee the truce. This allowed
the Soviets to monitor closely the political path chosen by
the Finnish government.
The bravery shown during the Winter War and the
postwar unity of the Finnish government and people
ultimately won the day. The Finnish people freely elected a
loOrjan Berner, Soviet Policies Toward the Nordic
Cntrie (Lanham, Md.: Center for International Affairs,
Harvard University, University Press of America, 1986), pp.
36-37.
"-Ibid, p. 36.
l2Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (San Diego:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1962), p. 155.
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new political leadership, headed by J. K. Paasikivi. Its
relationship at that point with the Soviets can best be
described as cautious and pragmatic -- as would be expected
when dealing from an inferior position. A final peace
agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and Finland in
1947 at Paris. The treaty was "...accompanied by a series
of good-will gestures, including passage of Finnish trains
through the Porkkala area, albeit with the windows
closed."1' 3
The Soviet-Finnish Pact of Friendship,
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), negotiated in the
Summer of 1948, defined the framework for Soviet-Finnish
relations that has existed to the present. It is interesting
to note that the Finns drafted the treaty, not the Soviets.
In time was born the term, Finlandization, which to
the western political mind means any "neutral nation" that
is sympathetic to Moscow of necessity. The independent
Finns however dislike the term, feeling that it denotes
submission to Soviet demands. 4
' 
3Berner, p. 42.
"Kennedy-Minott, p. 37. Ambassador Minott served as the
United States Ambassador to Sweden during the Carter
administration and his work gives a good overview of U.S.-
Scandinavian relations from the post-war period through the
mid-1980s. "Finlandization" is thought to be a term of
11
From the early 1950s until the Brezhnev era, Finland
was in the middle of many East-West political
confrontations. For example, when West Germany joined NATO
in 1954-55, Moscow exerted considerable pressure on Finland
to promote the Soviet alternative of an all-European
collective security system. (Not the last time the Soviets
promoted this idea.)
In 1957, in order to dramatize his policy of
"peaceful coexistence," Soviet Premier Khrushchev returned
to Finland the area of Porkkala and extended the FCMA treaty
for 20 years. Soviet naval power moved from the Gulf of
Finland to Murmansk and the southern Baltic during this
period, signaling a shift in Moscow's strategic interest
toward the Kola Peninsula and the open waters of the North
Atlantic.,"',
The Berlin crisis in the fall of 1961, put the
FCMA treaty to the acid test:
... Khrushchev proposed to Finnish President Urho
Kekkonen that they consult under the treaty. Kekkonen
was at the time on an official visit to the U.S., in
fact in Hawaii. After returning to Finland, he
visited Khrushchev and talked him out of formal
consultations.16
contempt originated by the late conservative West German




After the Berlin crisis and the U.S.-Soviet standoff
over the "Missiles of October" in 1962, Soviet foreign
policy interest shifted from Europe. Presumably, the
perception was that the situation in Berlin had reached a
status quo and any attempt to shift the balance was
considered too volatile an issue to pursue.' 7 Moscow looked
to the fertile grounds of the Third World in which to spread
its influence. This helped relieve the pressure on the
Nordic countries and the Baltic. The relationship between
the Finland and the Soviet Union has remained one of relaxed
stability and mutual benefit to both parties through the
present.
2. Soviet - Swedish Policy
The Soviet - Swedish relationship since the end of
the Second World War can be described as one of respect for
Swedish neutrality, inter-mixed with periods of heightened
"rJohn C. Ausland, Nordic Security and the Great Powers
(Bolder, CO.: Westview Press, 1986), p. 142. Kekkonen
handled the "Note Crisis" well. The Swedes were quite
anxious over events as they unfolded. Kekkonen took a
leisurely ship cruise home to Finland, allowing the
situation to defuse.
"7Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, F
S (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1983), pp. 124-5.
13
tensions caused mainly by provocative Soviet military
intrusions into Swedish territorial airspace and waters. Ia
The Soviets have viewed the Swedes as a vital western
trading partner, underscored by the fact that Sweden was the
first Western nation to accept officially Soviet gold for
trade payment.'9
Nevertheless, Sweden's capitalistic nature, self-
proclaimed neutrality, and pro-western, socialistic
government were reasons enough for Stalin and Molotov to
feel that Sweden was in the Western "camp" after the war.
(The sale of iron ore to and providing rail transportation
for the Nazis during the war did not help matters.) The
Soviet press, immediately after the war, condemned this
cooperation and pushed for a more sympathetic stance toward
Moscow.20 By 1946 however, this Soviet criticism had
'
8 Swedish neutrality has worked to the advantage of both
the United States and the Soviet Union. Has long as Sweden
maintained a strong defense force, the United States (and
Norway) did not have to devote resources to defend the area.
The Soviets benefited because Sweden's stated neutrality
served as a buffer much like Finland. See: Ola Tunander,
Cold Water Politics (London, Newbury Park and New Delhi:
SAGE Publications, and International Peace Research
Institute, Oslo, 1989), p. 11.
"Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr M. Nekrich, UtopiLAn
PO%[r: The History of the Soviet Union From 1917 to the
Present, trans. Phyllis B. Carlos (New York: Summit Books,
1986), p. 122.
2 Berner, p. 53.
14
diminished. Ironically, the Swedish press took a
progressively hostile view toward the Soviet Union at this
time.21 These journalistic exchanges set the tone for
Soviet-Swedish relations for the next forty years; a cyclic
media battle.
The late 1940s to early 1950s, witnessed strained
Soviet-Swedish relations. Sweden supported Western
condemnation in the U.N. of Communist aggression in Korea.
Bolshevik, the Soviet's theoretical mouthpiece, published an
article in April 1951, entitled "Sweden's Rightist Social
Democrats--the Lackeys of American Imperialism." This
article roundly condemned the pro-western, capitalist
government of the Swedes for giving aid to U.N. forces
fighting in Korea and participation in trade embargoes
against the Eastern Bloc countries. Some firms, such as
SKF, followed COCOM guidelines and claimed to Eastern
European customers that their production capacity was fully
booked. 2
2
Another source of friction between the two
governments during this period was the mysterious
disappearance of the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg while
21Ibid, pp. 53-4.
-
2 Ibid, p. 79.
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assisting Hungarian Jews. He was arrested in Budapest in
1945 and charged with spying by the Soviets. His
whereabouts remained unknown until 1957, when The Soviets
admitted that he had died in the Gulags in 1947.23
The height of Swedish-Soviet tensions in the early
postwar period came in mid-June of 1952, during the so
called "Catallina affair". The Soviets shot down two
Swedish reconnaissance planes over international waters in
the Baltic. The Swedes claimed that the two aircraft were
on peaceful missions in international airspace. The Soviets
claim that the first Catallina, with a crew of eight, was on
an electronic spying mission for NATO. Additionally, they
claimed the two aircraft were in Soviet airspace and opened
fire when the intercepting aircraft tried to force them to
land. 24 Whether the downing of these aircraft occurred over
international airspace or not, it served notice to the small
Nordic nations that military (or civilian) flights too close
to sensitive Soviet installations would be dealt with
quickly and severely.
By the mid-50s, the East-West "thaw" affected
Soviet relations with Sweden as well as the rest of the
23 Ibid, p. 80.
24Berner, p. 80-81.
16
world.2 5  Moscow continued to insist that a neutral policy
"be active and contribute through political initiatives to
the peaceful solution of international problems;''26  it
remained suspicious of Swedish neutrality and felt that the
size of the Swedish armed forces was too large for the
defensive purpose of a small nation. The Swedes replied
that such force was necessary to maintain their neutrality.
The most damaging incidents to Soviet-Swedish
relations in recent years have been the Soviet submarine
incursions into Swedish territorial waters. According to
scholar and author, Ola Tunander, these can be divided into
five distinct periods since the 1950s and have sometimes
resulted in serious diplomatic strains.27  By 1982, the
25The 1954 Geneva Agreement, negotiated by the
superpowers on behave of the French and the Vietminh,
settled the Indo-china War by dividing the country along the
17th parallel. The cooperation between the two superpowers
was viewed, at least briefly, as a thaw in the Cold War.
See: David K. Hall, "The Laos Neutralization Agreement,
1962," in U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation, Alexander
George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, (New York
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 435-6.
26Berner, 83. The Soviet was able to use "neutrality"
to its political advantage in the Third World. If these
Third World countries were "non-aligned," then they were not
part of the Western camp and could possibly "persuaded" to
side with Moscow on important international issues.
2
'Ola Tunander, "Gray Zone or Buffer Zone: the Nordic
Borderland and the Soviet Union", Nordic Journal of Soviet
and East European Studies, Vol. 4:4 (1987), p. 16.
17
number of sighting increased to around 40 including reported
mini-subs and robot submarines. The most famous incidents
were the "Whiskey on the Rocks" affair in October 1981, and
the "Horsfjaerden incident" in the summer of 1982.28
Although a series of accusations and counter-accusations
followed in both the Swedish and Soviet press, both sides
were careful not to cut off diplomatic ties. The Soviets do
not appear to have learned from the 1982 incident. Reports
of sightings continued as late as 1989.29
The early 1980s witnessed the deployment of Ground
Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing IIs in Western
Europe and of Tomahawk Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs)
aboard U.S. Navy vessels. The Soviet military buildup on
the Kola since the mid-1950s had made the peninsula a high
priority target area for Western military planners. In an
East-West confrontation, any Western launches from the
southern Norwegian Sea to the Kola or any Soviet cruise
missiles launched from the Kola to Western Europe would have
to transit Swedish airspace. The Swedes take this violation
2 Berner, 150, and Jan Breemer, Soviets Submarines:
Design. Development and Tactics (Coulsdon, Surry (UK):
Jane's Information Group, 1989), p. 158.
29Rodger Magnergard, "Foreign Submarine in the Inner
Archipelago for Over a Week," Svenska Dagbladet, 5 February
1989, p. 6, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-028, 13 February 1989, p. 17.
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of their sovereignty seriously and practice shooting down
cruise missiles in their exercises.30
3. Soviet Policy Toward the Scandinavian Members of
NATO
Norway, Denmark, and Iceland comprise the Nordic
members of NATO. In 1948, Sweden, Denmark and Norway
discussed the formation of a Nordic security league but were
not successful in this endeavor.3' Fear of Soviet
expansionism in the late 1940s brought Norway, Denmark, and
Iceland into the NATO fold. That this should happen could
not have been a complete surprise to the Russians.
According to Berner, throughout the war "[t]he Soviets saw
Norway and Denmark . . . as an area of British-American
military responsibility. "32 Norway and Denmark were
liberated by the Western allies, although the Red Army
briefly occupied the northern Norwegian county of Finnmark
3CTunander, "Gray Zone," p. 14. This is not a new
issue. U.S. and Soviet strategic bomber forces would have
to cross Swedish airspace on their polar routes to get to
their targets.
33William J. Taylor, Jr. and Paul M. Cole, ed., Nordic
Defense: Comparative Decision Making (Lexington, MA:
Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1985), pp. 1 and
114.
3 2 Berner, p. 57.
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and the Danish island of T3ornholm. 33  Iceland, a former
Danish colony, had been occupied by the British in 1940 and
the U.S. in 1941. As the Cold War developed and
intensified, these countries had the misfortune of sitting
astride potential Soviet lines of interdiction into the
Atlantic, and accordingly hold great strategic value for
both the East and West.
The Danish-Soviet relationship has, for the most
part, been a correct and stable one. Tensions have been
occurred at times, notably in 1962, when the Danes and the
West Germans formed a joint military command, "BALTAP,"
(Baltic Approaches). As might be expected, the Soviets
objected to the joint command structure and sent a strongly
worded "note" to Copenhagen calling the plan "measures which
complicate the situation in the Baltic area and concern the
security interest of other Baltic States. ''34  Another bone
of contention has been the use of Danish airfields by NATO
aircraft involved electronic surveillance of Warsaw Pact
operations. The Danes have sought to reassure Moscow by not
allowing the stationing of foreign troops or nuclear weapons
3 3 Kennedy-Minott, pp. 2 and 40; and Berner, pp. 53-54.
34Berner, p. 86; and Christian Thune and Nikolaj
Peterson, "Denmark," in Taylor and Cole, p. 3.
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on their soil during peacetime. 3 5 Their hedging on the
"Euro-missile" question in the late 1970s raised questions
among the alliance partners of how Denmark would respond to
an East- West crisis.
Iceland, a charter member of NATO, has had a love-
hate relationship with the Alliance 3 6 . Iceland's military
capabilities are limited to a coast guard fleet used mainly
for fisheries protection. Its main Allied contribution under
several bilateral treaties is to provide basing rights for
NATO forces in the strategic approaches to the North
Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea. As noted earlier, Iceland
was occupied by Allied troops during WWII. Although
Icelanders were mostly sympathetic to the Allied cause, the
fact that the British showed up uninvited in the spring of
1940 with an occupation force did not sit well with
Icelandic independence-minded attitudes. Iceland was trying
to rid itself of its colonial master, Denmark. U.S. Marines
relieved part of the British forces one year later. (Of
3sBerner, pp. 86-88. Moscow sent a "note" in 1961
warning Denmark that if nuclear weapons were stored in
country, Denmark would become a nuclear target.
34For an excellent overview of Iceland's relationship
with the United States and NATO refer to: Albert Jonsson,
Iceland. NATO. and the Keflavik Base, (Reyjkavik: The
Icelandic Commission on Security and International Affairs,
1989); and Kennedy-Minott, pp. 19-24.
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note, Marines were defending Iceland before the Japanese
attack at Pearl Harbor.) Icelanders are fiercely protective
of their culture and heritage which dates from settlement by
Irish monks in the 6th to 9th centuries. The cultural shock
introduced by these occupying forces caused considerable
disruption. These effects are still felt today and are
consistently brought up when basing rights or expanding
military presence are brought up for discussion in the
Althing (Parliament).
U.S. and British troops were withdrawn from
Iceland at war's end, but the U.S. retained authorization
for use of the air base at Keflavik. As the Cold War began
in the late 1940s, the pro-Western Icelandic government
reconsidered its non-allied stance and invited U.S. troops
to return.
Under the 1951 agreement with the United States,
manning of the NATO facility at Keflavik and at the radar
and communications stations is limited to approximately
3,100 military personnel with dependents. 37  The Soviets
applied diplomatic pressure on the Icelandic government,
conveying veiled threats concerning its involvement in
37Kennedy-Minott, p. 20. "The 1951 agreement was
described by the Russians as 'making Iceland virtually a
military base of the U.S.A.," from Berner, p. 71.
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Western politics. In the mid-1950s a communist majority was
elected to power. The Althing called for removal of
American troops from Iceland, but the Soviet invasion of
Hungary a couple of months later, contributed to the
government's fall from power and the signature of a base
agreement with the United States. 30
The Norwegian-Soviet relationship is more complex.
Norway's northernmost county, Finnmark, shares a common
border with the Soviet Union (and, as noted above, was
occupied briefly after the Second World War by the Soviets).
Additionally, the Soviets and the Norwegians have a series
of pre-war bilateral agreements to work out. Under a
Versailles Treaty mandate, the Norwegians received control
of Svalbard (Spitzbergen)39 . In 1944, Soviet Foreign
Minister Molotov tried to persuade the Norwegian government
in exile to agree to a shared responsibility for the
archipelago, including Bear Island. Such an agreement would
have placed the Soviets in a significant geographic
advantage for protecting its Northern Flank in the post-war
period. Under pressure from the British, who recognized the
38Ibid.
"
9William L. Langer,ed., An Encyclopedia of World
History, 5th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1980), p.
1044.
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importance of the island group, the Norwegians refused. The
Soviets, as signatories to the 1922 Spitzbergen Treaty, were
permitted to conduct mining and scientific activities; the
Soviets expanded these endeavors, knowing that the
Norwegians could not really do more than protest. Under the
treaty however, neither side can establish naval bases or
permanent fortifications there.40
Another issue pre-dating World War II is that of the
territorial sea boundary between the Soviet Union and
Norway. The Soviets claim that the boundary should extend
from the demarcation line north toward the pole, while the
Norwegians claim that it should extend at forty-five degrees
from the baseline (see Figure 2). At stake are the
potentially rich fishing and undersea mineral and oil
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FIGURE 2. NORWEGIAN CLAIMED AREA OF MILITARY
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DISPUTED "GRAY ZONE".
(Source: Norwegian Defense Review, 1991. Published
by the Norwegian Defense Association.)
Norway decided to cast its lot with NATO when the
pan-Nordic security initiative fell apart in the late
25
1940s. 41  At that time Norway was militarily weak and,
having no illusions about the aggressive nature of Soviet
expansionism, saw an alliance with the West as its best
protection. Aware however of Russian sensitivities toward
strengthening military forces in the region, Norway refused
the presence of nuclear weapons in the country (later to be
amended to nuclear weapons would not be stored in country
during peacetime) and the stationing of non-Norwegian troops
in Norway during peacetime.42 Since then, the importance of
Norway as a partner in the Alliance as steadily increased.
With the shift of the main Soviet fleet
strength from the Baltic to the Northern Seas, the
military build up of the Kola Peninsula, and the
increasing importance of SSBNs in The Soviet strategic
force posture, the Northern Flank and the Norwegian Sea
became more important to Western planners from the
1980s onward. NATO maritime forces have since
conducted a steady series of exercises in Norway's
fjords and the Norwegian Sea. 43
4"Berner, p. 64.
4 2James Stark, "Norway," in Taylor and Cole, pp. 108-
112; and Berner, p. 84.
43See Eric Grove, ed., NATO's Defense of the North
(London: Brassey's (UK), 1989), pp. 2-3, and 33-4; and "The
Maritime Strategy Supplement."
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C. THE FUTURE FOR SOVIET-SCANDINAVIAN RELATIONS
Thirty five nations gathered in Helsinki in the summer
of 1975 to become signatories to the "Helsinki Accords"
devised by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE). The accords marked a new period of East-West
cooperation that was to last until the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. The summit has been compared to the Congress
of Vienna and the post-World War I Peace Conference in
Versailles. 44 The United States and Canada were included in
precursory discussions at the insistence of NATO countries
and became signatories.
The main Soviet objective at the conference was to gain
de facto recognition of the status quo in Europe; i.e. a
divided Germany and Eastern Europe under Soviet domination.
The in "spirit of detente", the Western side was willing to
accept the existing boundaries in Europe if the Soviets
would allow possible change to take place in Eastern Europe.
The United States attitude was slightly different from that
of the Western Europe's since it was in the midst of
strategic weapons negotiations with the Soviets. It feared
44John J. Maresca, "Helsinki Accord, 1975," in U.S.-
Soviet Security Cooperation, ed. Alexander L. George, Philip
J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988), p. 106. This chapter gives a good account of
the background and objective of the main players at the
conference; the United States, the Soviet Union, and Western
Europe.
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that the Accords would raise undue optimism at home toward
reaching a strategic agreement and thought that nothing
meaningful would be accomplished in Helsinki. 4 5
During the late Carter and early Regean administrations,
CSCE lost much of its impetus due to increased East-West
tensions after the Afghan invasion by the USSR. It did
however remain important in that period for citing reported
human rights violations by the Soviets. Gorbachev brought
renewed interest in the Accords when in 1985 he stated:
The Political Bureau starts from the assumption that
the interstate documents of the "detente" period,
including the Helsinki Final Act, have lost none of
their value. They are an example of the way in which
international relations can be built. . .46
When the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty was
signed by twenty two countries in Paris in November, 1990,
it was hailed as the end of the European armed camp and the
final act of World War II. Under the treaty both NATO and
Warsaw Pact [sic] forces would make large reductions in
their conventional forces stationed between the Atlantic and
the Urals. Even before sending the treaty to the U.S.
45Maresca, p. 109.
46 "Helsinki: Ten Years Later, Report of the Soviet
Committee for Security and Cooperation in Europe" (Moscow:
Progress, 1985), p. 31, as quoted in Maresca, p. 118.
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Senate for ratification, questions and issues of Soviet non-
compliance grew. Three Soviet motorized infantry divisions
that would have been counted under CFE counting rules were
transferred to the Kola Peninsula and subordinated to the
Navy as "Costal Defense Units.''4 7 Additionally, Soviet Air
Force, dual capable, attack aircraft have been transferred
to naval control on the Kola as well.48 This led to concern
in the Bush Administration that the Soviet Military has
reasserted control of the arms control process and was
becoming more involved in national security decision making.
Administration analysis believe:
[t]he Soviet military is particularly unhappy with the
new agreement cutting conventional forces in Europe,
which codifies the withdrawal of Soviet forces from
Eastern Europe and which requires Moscow to make much
greater weapons cuts than the West. 49
4
'Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN,
before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on
Intelligence Issues, 7 March 1991, p. 17.
4aIbid, p. 11 and p. 17. Brooks sees the Soviet Navy's
role in defense of the homeland increasing as the CFE cuts
take place. Although land based naval aircraft is not
included in the treaty limited equipment, the Soviets
reluctantly agreed to state that "they would not have more
than 400 land based combat (my parenthesis) naval aircraft
in the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU) by 40 months after CFE
entry-into-force.
49
"Outlook is Cloudy for an Arms Deal by U.S. and
Soviets," New York Times, National Edition, 6 February
1991, p. A6(W).
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Remembering the Carter administration's failure with the
second round of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT
II), the present administration had second thoughts about
submitting CFE to the Senate, recent discussions have
resolved most issues and the treaties appear to be back on
track. 50
Norwegian concern over the Soviet military build up in
the Kola region is expressed in their press and in the
writings of their military leadership. Although CFE reduced
military tensions along the Central Front, Norway fears that
the flanks have become more vulnerable, but that the
Alliance may be lulled into a false sense of Nordic
security.5'
The history of Soviet-Scandinavian relations has at
times been strained on both the military and diplomatic
fronts over the past four and a half decades. Overall,
however, it has remained one of peaceful, balanced co-
existence. Given the present unrest in the Soviet Union,
5°Refer to Thomas L. Friedman, "Arms Talks: A Warm-Up,"
New York Times, 10 June 1991, p. A1(W).
5 2Captain Hallin, RNN, Norwegian Naval Attache,
interview by author, notes taken during the interview,
Washington, D.C., 11 April 1991.
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especially the Baltic region, the question is whether this
will this last?
The five countries that comprise the Nordic region are
roughly equivalent in size to the combined areas of France,
what was West Germany, and the United Kingdom, but its
population is only one-eight. Two share a common border
with the Soviet Union. These five countries are the Soviet
Union's second largest trading partner in the free world and
only eight other countries have higher gross national
products (GNPs) than the combined GNPs of this group.52
Recent discoveries of petroleum and natural gas have made
the littorals of these nations not only strategically
important, but economically important as well.
Scandinavia will continue to be of economic and
strategic importance to the Soviet Union. Having stated its
intent to scale back its involvement in the third world, to
create a military based on defensive sufficiency, but also
to continue modernization of the facilities in the Kola
peninsula, the Nordic region will, in all likelihood, become
more vital for the Soviet Union. Regardless of what changes
take place the Soviets are masters of Realpolitik and must
consider the regional balance of power.
5 2 Berner, p. 2.
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The Soviet Union remains a strong nation militarily
having the capability to disrupt international commerce and
communication to our vital interest. If we wish to continue
our traditionally close security and political ties with the
Nordic countries, we need to reassess our strategy in this
critical region.
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III. THE POST WORLD WAR II U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY
If asked what the maritime strategy of the United States
is, most naval officers will describe the strategy developed
and implemented during the 1980s under the outspoken
Secretary of the Navy (SecNav), John Lehman in concert with
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral James D.
Watkins and Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), P. X.
Kelly.5 3  So successful was the public relations selling
campaign of the "Lehman Strategy," few people outside, or
for that matter inside, the Navy know of any other.
The development of the maritime strategy of the United
States however, is not a onetime strategy as this might
suggest. The maritime strategy has been and remains a
dynamic strategy requiring constant review to ensure it
remains responsive to the international and domestic
interest of the United States. The end of the "Cold-War"
53 Although there is an abundance of published material
concerning the "Maritime Strategy" of Lehman, Watkins, and
Kelly, probably the best unclassified material is: Congress,
Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Sea
Power and Power Projection, Secretary of the Navy John
Lehman addressing the Maritime Strategy, 98th Cong., 2nd
Sess., 14 March 1984; "The Maritime Strategy Supplement" to
Pc ings (January 1986); and John B. Hattendorf, "The
Evolution of the Maritime Strategy: 1977 to 1987," Naval War
College Review (Summer 1988), pp. 7-22.
33
presents a new set of challenges for the Navy. As recent
events in the Persian Gulf have shown, the Soviet Union is
no longer the only potential adversary of con3equence the
United States must plan for in the coming years. If
strategic planners wish to be effective, a basic historic
knowledge pertaining to the roots of the present strategy is
required. Only then can sound judgements be made. From
many indications, the U.S. Navy again finds itself in the
position of justifying its mission as it has aftt.- every
conflict since its conception5 4 . The following overview of
the evolution of the Navy's post-World War II strategy is
not meant to be all-inclusive; it is intended only to
provide the reader a chain of major events leading to the
present Atlantic strategy and to show the failures anc
successes of Naval leadership along the way. By learning
from the mistakes and capitalizing on the successes of the
past, developing an Atlantic strategy for the 1990s and
beyond in made easier.
54Eliot A. Cohen, "After the Battie," The New Republic
(1 April 1991), p. 19; states that since the Spanish-
American War, American politicians have been divided over
the role and size of the U.S. Navy as witnessed in the
debate over building T. Roosevelt's "Great White Fleet.'-
The debate goes back even farther to the building of
frigates to protect American commerce on the high seas.
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A. THE AMERICAN MARITIME STRATEGY: 1945-1976
Although the United States maritime strategy can be
traced back to the origins of the American Navy, the present
strategy is a direct result of the position the United
States found itself in at the end of the Second World War.
The U.S. Navy was by far the largest and most powerful
armada the world had ever witnessed.55  Just its size in
manpower alone was staggering.56  Its far ranging fast
carrier battle groups and powerful amphibious forces had
vanquished Japan's naval might in the Pacific while
simultaneously working with the British to overcome the
threat of German "wolf packs" in the Atlantic that had
threatened the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to Europe.
The only remaining naval power that was capable of
seriously challenging the U.S. Navy, the Royal Navy, was
55 Michael A. Palmer, Origins of the Maritime Strategy,
Contributions to naval history series; no. 1 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 1.
!6 On 1 July 1940 the navy had only 13,162 officers and
744,824 enlisted men; on 31 August 1945 it had 316,675
officers and 2,935,695 enlisted men. Similar figures for
the Marine Corps are 1819 officers and 26,545 enlisted men
in 1940; 36,851 officers and 427,017 enlisted men at the end
of the war. These figures do not include 8399 women
officers and 73,685 enlisted women of the "Waves"; 813
officers and 17,350 enlisted women Marines, and 10,968
nurses, all at the end of the war. Samuel E. Morison, The
Two-Ocean War (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), p.
586.
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allied with the U.S. and not considered a threat.5 7
Although Soviet post-war consolidation of Eastern Europe and
its expansionist policies posed a threat to the free world,
its military power was concentrated in the Red Army, a
continental power. China, in the midst of a civil war, was
not considered a naval power. The Soviet Navy was mainly a
small defensive force, with very limited power projection
capability. It did however, own the second largest
submarine force in the world.5 8  The U.S Navy -radually
assumed the role that the Royal Navy had previously filled,
that of maintaining the Western world's oceanic commerce
routes and "showing the flag" as an instrument of America's
foreign policy. However, the Navy's historic position as
the primary instrument of foreign policy was being
challenged by politics and advancements in technology.
Several factors account for the status the Navy found
itself in immediately following the war. Its very success
in the war gave cause for some members of government to
question the need for a large navy. If there was no longer
a naval threat posed, why maintain a navy?59  The newly
57Great Britain was embroiled in a series of post-war
governmental and colonial problems.
58 Jan Breemer, p. 75.
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formed U.S. Air Force argued that strategic bombers carrying
atomic bombs made navies obsolete. Future wars would be
atomic wars that would be fought by high altitude super-
bombers or as envisioned by some farsighted individuals,
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).
Another factor was the "isolationist" holdover element
in Congress and the public from the inter-war years. The
United States had fought the good fight; now it was time to
bring the "boys" home. The left over colonial problems of
the post-war period were Europe's problems. Looming in the
forefront were questions of how to centralize federal
control of the military and the cost of maintaining armed
forces to deal with emerging international realities.
Under Congressional pressure to unify the Armed Forces,
the Departments of Navy and War were combined to form the
Department of Defense with the Departments of the Army, the
Navy, and the Air Force subordinate to it. The respective
service chiefs formed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) who
were supposedly subordinate to the Chairman of the Joint
s9 Palmer, 1-2; This view lead to the super-carrier (the
U.S.S. United States, whose keel had been laid) versus the
super-bomber (the B-36) debate in Congress ultimately
leading to the infamous "Revolt of the Admirals" for which
the CNO at the time, Admiral Denfeld, was ultimately
relieved of his job on 27 October 1949. The resulting
inter-service rivalry has lasted to the present. For
further details see Palmer, Chapters 1-4.
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Chiefs (CJCS) whose position was filled on a rotating basis
by the three services (the Marine Corps is considered part
of the Department of the Navy). By combining the services
in this manner, Congress hoped that component force needs
would be clarified and better controlled to meet national
interest in a period of fiscal austerity. This scenario
should sound familiar to the reader of the early 1990s.
As events would have it, world developments began to
shape U.S. policy. Events in 1948 caused the Western world
to take notice of Soviet consolidation of power in Eastern
Europe. There were uprisings in Soviet occupied East
Germany and Czechoslovakia; the Soviets blockaded Western
access to West Berlin; communist forces in Greece were
conducting a civil war; and George Kennan, as head of the
U.S. State Department's Policy Planning Staff, formulated
National Security Memorandum 20 (NSC/20), which with the
Marshall Plan, formed the United States' answer to apparent
Soviet expansionist foreign policy. The "Containment
Strategy," as NSC/20 became known and the follow on NSC/68,
formed the basis of U.S. global strategy for almost three
decades.60
6 For background information on events leading up to the
formulation and implementation of NSC/20, see the following:
George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, Expanded Edition
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 107-54;
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As early as 1946, the U.S. Navy had identified the
Soviet Union as the new threat to American security, "a foe
against which the Navy must prepare to fight as much ashore
as at sea. 6''6 Conventional forces such as a navy are
expensive to procure and maintain. Nuclear forces however,
are less expensive and since the primary threat was the Red
Army, the strategic nuclear forces concept carried the day
in Congressional budgeting. Accordingly, the Navy, so as
not to be subordinate to the Air Force's bomber forces,
began to develop its own plans for naval attack aircraft and
carriers capable of launching nuclear strikes against the
Soviet Union. Simultaneously plans were developed for
submarines capable of carrying nuclear armed missiles and
hunter-killer submarines that would go after Soviet
submarines in their home waters.62
John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982), pp. 25-88; and Frederick H.
Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, Defending America's Security
(New York: Brassey's (US), 1990), p. 129. Kennan would
later state that his intentions with regard to containing
Soviet expansionism was to bring diplomatic and economic
pressure to bear vice military pressure. See the foreword
in American Diplomacy. For background on NSC/68 see:
Gaddis, pp. 82-95.
61Palmer, p. 7. Vice Admiral Harry W. Hill, reviewing
the "Basic Post-War Plan No. 1 as directed by Fleet Admiral
Ernest King, judged that a war with the Soviet Union would
not be a war at sea in the classic sense, fought only with
naval combatants, but would necessitate a balanced "Navy"
force utilizing air, sea, land, and support forces.
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Rumors that the Soviets might force Norway into agreeing
to a treaty such as the one signed with Finland, galvanized
these countries into a regional security pact to check
perceived Soviet expansion into this vital geo-strategic
area.6 3  On August 24, 1949, the United States joined with
Great Britain, France and other West European countries to
form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As a
result, the NATO alliance became the predominate focal point
of American political and military planners until the
present, often at the expense of other regions of the world.
(The possible exception being Southeast Asia during the
Vietnam War. This "Europe First" posture is in many ways,
the root of American policy failure in other parts of the
world.)64
*2Ibid, pp. 24-62. In the spring of 1946, the Navy
conducted "Operation Frostbite" with Midway class carriers
in sub-arctic waters to test their capabilities in these
regions. Although tempo was reduced, they proved that such
operations were possible. In the spring of 1949, a group of
U.S. conventional-powered fleet submarines; Tusk, Cochino,
Toro, and Corsair, operated in the Barents Sea as far east
as 30 East and within 12 nm of North Cape. The success of
the mission established the diesel powered hunter-killer
(SSK) program in the U.S. Navy.
63Kennedy-Minott, p. 2.
64 Robert W. Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition
Defense," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1983), p. 1127. Komer
notes that the United States had focus its post World War II
policy attention on Europe and Northeast Asia, preparing for
a possible 2-1/2 front war. The Sino-Soviet split in the
1960s allowed the Nixon-Ford administration to shift to a 1-
40
Admiral Forrest Sherman, as Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Operations), 1946-47, and his staff devised the
Navy's first true post-war maritime strategy that guided
Navy planning until the mid-1950s. It called for the Navy
to "assume the offensive immediately in order to secure our
own sea communications, support our forces overseas, disrupt
enemy operations, and force dissipation of enemy
strength." 65  Although engaging the Soviet Navy in the
Arctic regions was discussed, Sherman believed that the main
area of concern for the Atlantic fleet should be the
Mediterranean. He did recognize that the Northern region's
importance would grow over time, but that operations in the
area were presently too difficult.66 Sherman's proposed
strategy sounds very much like the strategy of Secretary
Lehman three and a half decades later; only the relative
importance of the regions are reversed.
1/2 front, Eurocentric mentality. This in turn allowed
events such as the demise of the Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO), the fall of the Shah, and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan to occur.
65Palmer, p. 30.
6 Ibid. Sherman believed that advancements in missile
technology and aircraft would be the factors shifting the
balance toward the north and it would be necessary for the
U.S. to control the region so our strategic aircraft could
operate there.
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The strategy had an Achilles heel however; the lack of
public dissemination. Elements of the plan were militarily
and politically sensitive. Even members of Congress were
frustrated by the lack of information available.67 The Navy
was to suffer from this flaw in the coming years.
By 1953, the Strategic Plans Division of the Navy,
noting the build up of naval capability in the Kola
Peninsula, began to focus its attention toward Soviet North
Fleet operations. A study released in October stated that:
The Northeast Atlantic-Norwegian Sea-Barents Sea area
may well be the area of decision with respect to the
success of any United States operations to maintain the
flow of supplies to our European Allies and to our U.S.
forces in Western Europe. This area is of two fold
importance -- first as an avenue for the movement of
U.S. shipping; secondly, as the area from which the
Soviet submarine threat may be stopped at is source. .
• . Of further importance is the fact that the
northwestern and northern coast of Norway are extremely
attractive sites for submarine bases. The fjords are
ideal places to construct sub pens tunneled into cliffs
rising from the sea. Were the Soviet[s] to capture
these coastal areas by amphibious operations, they
could construct submarine bases in the fjords that
would be all but invulnerable to air attack. Another
critical aspect of this area is the fact that the
Barents Sea is the attack route to the only significant
submarine base for Atlantic submarines now available to
the Soviets. With the Bosphorus and Baltic exits
67 Ibid. The plan assumed that if war were to break out,
most of Europe would be rapidly overrun by the Red Army.
Therefore the Navy planned to forward base it assets in
bases in the southern Mediterranean.
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sealed, Soviet submarines must be operated from their
northern bases. 68
Although Burke's office circulated the study, events
outside the control of the Navy were to establish new guide
lines for Navy planning.
The Defense Department Reorganization Plan 6 of April
1953 brought a change to the strategic planning process of
the Navy. Before that time, the service chiefs were largely
responsible for their respective plans. Plan 6 called for
giving increase powers to the Secretary of Defense, CJCS,
the Service Secretaries, and the unified commanders.19  The
Navy's failure to promulgate its "maritime strategy" as
developed by Admiral Sherman resulted in a failure to
influence joint military and national policy. Additionally,
the Eisenhower Administration's belief that nuclear weapons
were an economical alternative to conventional forces
resulted in a reorganization of naval planning from
classical naval missions toward development of a nuclear
6"Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke to list, 13 October
1953, enclosing a study of attack carrier force levels, A4,
box 280, Strategic Plans, as quoted in Palmer, p. 77. The
statement is based on the assumption that the Turks and the
Danes would cooperate and be capable of closing the straits.
"'Fredrick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, Defending
America's Security, 2nd ed. (New York: Brassey's ,US),
1990), chapters 10 and 11, contain an excellent overview of
DOD reform attempts.
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strike capability against land based targets. The key to
solving the budgeting problems in that period was to have a
nuclear mission.70 U.S. carriers were assigned a strategic
role on the Northern Flank, that of conducting nuclear
strikes which lead to building up forces centered around
Murmansk and equipping Soviet naval vessels with Surface to
Surface Missiles (SSM) for anti-carriers missions. 7 This
nuclear mentality was to dominate until the Kennedy-Johnson
Administrations developed the "flexible response" strategy
of the 19601s, in many ways similar to the Reagan
Administration's military posture of vertical and horizontal
escalation.72 It called for strengthening America's
conventional forces which Kennedy believed had been
neglected during the Eisenhower era.' 3
7°John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 148, 152, and 184.
Additionally, the report of the "Gaither Committee" to
Congress as sighted on pages 184-5, offered a share of the
strategic deterrence mission to each branch of the Armed
Forces reinforced development of the Navy nuclear mission.
7"Tunander, Cold Water Politics, p. 25.
72Norman Friedman, The Maritime Strategy (London: Jane's
Publications, 1988), pp. 1-149, 155-75, and 182-205 discuss
the concepts of vertical and horizontal escalation in war
fighting.
'73 Gaddis, pp. 198-217.
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U.S. security interests in the Nordic region during this
period has been sometimes described as "benign neglect."
The Soviet buildup on the Kola Peninsula had not caught the
eye of Western security analyst yet. Sweden's military
power was considered capable of deterring any Soviet
expansion in the region, but by the late 1980s, its force
structure was only half of the size it had been in the
1950s/1960s. 7 4  It took the United States until the mid-
1970s to realize the region could no longer be ignored.
B. THE BUILDUP OF THE SOVIET NAVY IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD
The Soviet Navy during this period began to recover from
the devastation brought upon it by Germany. Soviet maritime
strategy following the war was a defensive strategy aimed at
denying projection of American and British naval power
against the Soviet Homeland.75 Stalin, having witnessed the
global power projection capability of the U.S. Navy in the
Pacific, envisioned a build up of the Soviet Fleet enabling
this defensive strategy. Fleets and ships require a long
74Tunander, Cold Water Politics, p. 125.
75Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet
Srtratgy, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1989), p. 99. Stalin seemed to fear an amphibious invasion
by the West. Perhaps the memory of Western forces occupying
Archangel after the Revolution was still fresh.
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time to build up however, and the lack of offensive naval
power was to prove troublesome for Soviet foreign policy in
the late 1940s. U.S. and British maritime strength in the
Mediterranean preventing direct Soviet naval intervention in
the Greek communist uprising.76
The death of Stalin in 1953 resulted in a reversal of
the planned build up. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) was
dominated by the Army. The Soviets, like the West earlier,
came to regard nuclear weapons as the predominate force
equalizer for future wars and that large navies were
obsolete. Khrushchev, in his push to make the Soviet Union
economically equal or superior to the United States,
cancelled the large naval combatant building programs,
wishing to concentrate on smaller units, especially
submarines and aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
Khrushchev appointed Admiral Sergei Gorshkov to oversee
the build down. In a twist of fate, Gorshkov was to oversee
the expansion of the Soviet Navy to a force capable of
challenging the United States naval supremacy. Gorshkov had
commanded naval forces with distinction in the Black Sea
during World War II, attaining the rank of Rear Admiral in
1941, after only ten years of commissioned service. He rose
'
6 Ibid, p. 100.
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rapidly to positions of power and was serving as First
Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy by 1955.
Khrushchev, who wanted someone who agreed with his outlook
and would follow the Party line to command the Navy,
appointed Gorshkov Commander-in-Chief in 1956. It is ironic
that Gorshkov was chosen because under his tutelage, the
Soviet Navy began the largest expansion in its history
transforming into a "blue water" force.' 7
In the early 1970s, Gorshkov published a series of
eleven articles in Morskoi Sbr.ik (the Naval Review)
entitled 'Navies in War and Peace.' This seminal work was
later expanded into a second edition that was eventually
translated into English as The Sea Power of the State. It
was immediately compared to Mahan's Influence of Sea Power
on History. Whether Gorshkov's work was meant to be an
indication of the Soviet Navy's focus and purpose is
debatable; what is nct debatable is the attention it
received from Western naval analysis.78
7
'Ibid, pp. 78-81.
78Ibid, pp. 81-92. Two schools of thought seem to
predominate the debate. One side, identified with naval
analyst Michael MccGwire, sees Sea-Power as "a fundamental
shift in the theoretical basis of Soviet Naval Policy."
MccGwire foresaw the mission of the Soviet Navy as being
able to defeat the Western naval alliance by conventional
means. This meant that the conventional war could possibly
be a protracted global war and the Soviet Navy must possess
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The 1962 Cuba. missile risis and the Soviet Navy's
inability to counter U.S. naval force was just what Gorshkov
needed to revitalize Soviet ship building programs and
expand operations7'. (See Tables 1 and 2) It was these
expanded operations that gradually galvanized (forced)
Western naval leadership into producing a response that
became "The Maritime Strategy" under Secretary Lehman.
the numbers and capability to deal with the West. The other
side is often identified with naval analysis James M.
McConnell. McConnell believed that regional conflicts would
quickly escalate into a global nuclear war between the
Soviets and the United States which would require a
completely different navy. For details on the debate see:
James M. McConnell, "The Gorshkov Articles, the New Gorshkov
Book, and their relation to Policy," in M.K. MccGwire and J.
McDonnell, eds. Soyiet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign
D (New York, Washington, London: Praeger, 1977),
pp. 54-7 and 565-620; MccGwire, "A New Trend in Soviet




TABLE 1: U.S. AND SOVIET SHIPBUILDING DELIVERIES, 1961-1975
(Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Soviet Shipbuilding
Deliveries, 1961-1975, 20 May 1976.)
Type of ship USSR US
Ballistic missile submarines 54 38
Attack submarines 177 57
Major surface combatants (3,000 tons and 57 117
more)
Major surface combatants (1,000-3,000 tons) 83 2
Minor surface combatants (incl. amphibious) 1,175 71
Underway replenishment ships 4 25
Other support ships 199 17
Total 1,749 327
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TABLE 2: SOVIET NAVAL STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF
OPERATIONAL FORCES BY FLEET: 1973-1984 (Source: compiled
from successive issues of: IISS, The Military Balance, as
cited in Robert G. Weinland, "The Soviet Naval Buildup in
the High North: A Reassessment," Sverre Jervell and Kare
Nyblom, eds., The Military Build up of the High North
(Lanham, MD: Center for International Affairs Harvard
University and University Press of America, 1986), 25.)
Si'k' Nor7-Sbmgalk asi MV006s of Opeawhina
ftres by 71*0 193-1"40
Uehtlik Misse AtA MAffOS PIA
1973 46 -20 124 43 3 7 45 52 63 52
197449 -- 21 i 30 20 79 s6 s0 40 35
1975 53 - - 22 122 35 25 83 60 55 45 60
1976 55 6 - 23 126 12 19 74 51 47 59 37
1977 50 6 - 26 110 35 20 70 50 50 40 60
1971 53 6 - 31 120 30 25 70 " 5 O 73 65
1979 52 6 - 32 120 30 25 75 70 50 75 70
10i 4L 6 n 5 135 25 25 30 30 40 55 60
1911 45 6 24 135 22 223 0 12 42 34 86
1982 45 6 - 25 240 24 20 95 753 0 80 IS
1913 46 6 - 2 13. 24 25 92 76 40 3 9
1g84 42 6 - 31 138 26 4 102 I0 45 0 IS
torplw fm awasive im OP. .I Th MWiuk, Mn
'.140 - N'Ira Pe
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PA - Iirc Floet
Soviet naval exercise activity prior to the 1962 Cuban
missile crisis consisted mainly of defense of the homeland
exercises and very little open ocean excursions. The Navy
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was considered subordinate to the Army to support a land war
in Europe. In 1961, the first Soviet Fleet out of area
(OOA) exercise of significance took place in the Norwegian
Sea. It consisted of eight surface combatants, associated
auxiliary units and as many ae four submarines participated.
The goals were simple and the exercise was of brief
duration, but it marked the beginning of an increased naval
presence beyond the Soviet Union's littoral.8a
The period from 1963 to 1970 saw a significant increase
in the number and complexity of Soviet exercises in the
Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic. In 1963, a surface
group circumnavigated the British Isles and inter-fleet
transfers between the Black Sea, Baltic and Northern Fleets
increased. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron (SovMedRon)
was established in 1964. The Summer 1965 exercise saw a
scenario that placed combatants in the Iceland-Faeroe-United
Kingdom gaps to simulate opposing the entry of NATO naval
units into the Norwegian Sea.8'
By 1969, the Soviet Navy had developed into i force
capable of "showing the flag" globally and had developed its
BOSee charts in: NATO Letter, No. 9 (September 1970)
[the forerunner to NATO Review].
slIbid.
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own mission divorced from supporting the Army.82 The first
world wide OKEAN (OCEAN) exercise was held by the Soviet
Navy in the Spring of 1970. Although the sinking of a
November class nuclear submarine involved got the exercise
off to a shaky start, overall it was a success. The Soviets
conducted exercises south of the Greenland-Iceland-United
Kingdom (GIUK) Gap which involved fleet-on-fleet
engagements, multi-platform coordination including Soviet
Naval Aviation (SNA), and finally an amphibious landing on
the Kola Peninsula. A series of spring exercises between
1973-1976 saw the continued refinement of a defensive
barrier strategy in the choke points of the GIUK Gap. The
large.,t Soviet naval exercise to present, OKEAN-75, was held
in the summer of 1975.
The Kiev class V/STOL carrier was introduced into the
fleet in the summer of 1976 and conducted operations in the
Atlantic prior to transfer to the Northern Fleet. The Kiev
gave the Soviet Navy its first true organic air support
capability. Although its complement of Vertical/Short Take-
off and Landing (VSTOL) YAK-36 Forgers was out classed by
8 2Ranft and Till, p. 80. The SSBN fleet had become a
"second strike" force separate from the Strategic Rocket
Forces. The Soviet Navy's primary mission was no longer
supporting amphibious warfare for the Army. It was now
capable of conducting operations against Western navies.
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American carrier based tactical aircraft, they were capable
of an anti-ship role and could certainly counter allied
maritime patrol aircraft (MPA).
SpringEx '77 witnessed massive use of SNA simulating
waves of anti-carrier air-to-surface (ASM) strikes against
an aggressor CVBG, the establishment of defensive submarine
barriers, and the break out of forces south of the "Gap" to
threaten the Atlantic SLOCs to Europe. This is essentially
the pattern that Soviet exercises followed through the mid-
1980s and may have contributed to the evolution of the
Forward Maritime Strategy in the Norwegian Sea (See Figure
3).8 3
83The information on Soviet Naval exercise activity was
compiled from a reprint of: NATO Letter, No. 9 (September
1970) [the forerunner to NATO Review]; NATO Review, No. 6
(December 1976); and NATO Review, No. 1 (February 1986).
These three sources provide good charts and overviews of the
exercises. Also see: R. van Tol, "Soviet Naval Exercises
1983-1985," Naval Forces, Vol. 2 (June 1986), pp. 20-34; and
Ranft and Till.
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FIGURE 3: TYPICAL SOVIET EXERCISE PATTERN FROM 1977 TO THE
MID-1980S. (Source of graphic, PC-Globe, 3.0; Details
compiled from sources in footnote 21.)
C. THE U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY: 1976-1989
From the mid-1960s through the evacuation of Saigon in
April 1975, American naval strategy and commitments were
sharply divided between NATO and Southeast Asia. With the
end of American involvement in Vietnam, the United States
underwent a period of self-examination. The national
political leadership was disgraced after the Watergate
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scandal. The Navy was beset by a multitude of problems in
the post-Zumwalt era.8 4 The growth of the Soviet fleet and
its expanded presence in areas that had previously been
deemed exclusive Western areas of influence, (i.e.;
Southeast Asia, Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific
Ocean) resulted in new commitments for the Navy that
increased as the era of "detente" faded by the end of the
decade. This could not have come at a worst time for the
Navy. Many of the vessels that had been used for operations
during in the war were reaching the end of their service
lives and were not being replaced at the rate of
decommissioning. Critical mid-level personnel were leaving
the service in large numbers preventing, in some cases,
ships from meeting underway obligations. The all-volunteer
military was struggling to recruit sufficient numbers of
qualified personnel ia the post-war period due to low pay,
long hours and multi-year obligations.
8"Admiral Elmo Zumwalt was the Chief of Naval Operations
from July 1970-July 1974 and instituted numerous reforms in
the Navy, some of which did not sit well with the
institution bias. Hartmann and Wendzel, p. 198; state that
"[Zumwalt's] period in office was marked by a great deal of
turbulence and much less in the way of progress. What was
present in this period was energy, intelligence, and zest;
what was lacking was mature judgement, and deliberate,
careful change.
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An issue of concern for the Navy was the future force
size. The Department of Defense offered little help on this
matter. Under three Secretaries of Defense in five years,
naval force structure goals seemingly changed at whim. (see
Table 3) There is little wonder why the Navy seemed to lack
a sense of direction.
TABLE 3: NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE GOALS SET UNDER SECDEF
GUIDANCE 1975-1978.0 s




Although this has painted a bad picture, the Navy began
recover in the late 1970s. Groups within the Navy
recognized the lack of a comprehensive and cohesive
"maritime strategy." Military analysis and writers such as
Jonathan Howe, Edward Luttwak, and Kenneth Booth began
discussing again, the use of naval power to influence
foreign policy.01 CNO, Admiral Zumwalt categorized the four
0"Hattendorf, p. 10. *The 1977 DOD Consolidation
Guidance plan submitted by the Carter Administration
reflects its belief that the Surface Navy was for a peace
keeping role and third world conflicts that the Soviets
chose not to involve themselves in.
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foreign policy.86 CNO, Admiral Zumwalt categorized the four
missions of the Navy: strategic deterrence, power
projection, sea control, and naval presence.8 7  A group of
strategist that evolved into the Strategic Studies Group at
the Naval War College became the theoretical prophets of the
"new strategy."O" However as Admiral Sherman learned in the
early 1950s, a strategy without public support is not a
strategy. What was needed to bring the plan to fruition
were senior leaders with enough clout to get the attention
of those who controlled the purse strings -- Congress-- and
were vocal enough to reach the public. The efforts of the
War College study group were beginning to pay off in this
regard. Post-command officers who had completed the course
6sRefer to: Jonathan T. Howe, Multicrises (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1971); Edward N. Luttwak, The Political Uses of
Seor (Baltimore:John Hopkins University Press 1975);
Kenneth Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (London: Croom
Helm, 1977); and the key works of Rosinski and Rietzel, part
of the group at the Naval War College that laid the
foundations for the 1980s maritime strategy, that are
contained in, B. Mitchell Simpson III, ed., War. Strategy
and Maritime Strategy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press, 1977), pp. 63-110. Also see; Geoffrey Till, ed.,
Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, 2nd ed. (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 181-225.
'"Kennedy-Minott, p. 7; Till, pp. 62-3; and Peter M.
Swartz, "Contemporary U.S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography,"




of study at Newport were moving into positions in the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Fleet CINCs and
leading the effort to establish strategic awareness in the
Navy and Washington during the late 1970s.
The mind set in the Pentagon until then was that a war
with the Soviet Union would primarily be fought in Europe on
the Central Front; mainly by U.S. Army and Air Force units
in concert with NATO air and ground forces and would quickly
escalate into a nuclear exchange. The role envisioned for
the U.S. Navy and its Alliance partners would be reminiscent
of the "Battle for the Atlantic" fought during World War II.
Naval vessels would escort convoys of war material to
support forces on the Central Front, battle the Soviet
submarine threat and any surface forces that broke through
the "choke points" of the GIUK Gap and threatened the
SLOCs.00 The United States military and political
leadership had been lulled into a "Maginot Line" mentality
based on the technological edge afforded by the Sound
Surveillance System (SOSUS), believing that Allied air and
0'Evidence of such planning is noted in Kennedy-Minott,
pp. 7-8; and Robert S. Wood, "Fleet Renewal and Maritime
Strategy in the 1980s," Maritime Strateay and the Balance of
Power, J.B. Hattendorf and R.S. Jordan, ed. (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 332-3. Freidman, pp. 56-58.
Robert Wood, pp. 332-337; discuses the use of "choke points"
in naval strategy.
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sea forces would have adequate intelligence to deal with
Soviet sea based threats surviving the barrier defenses
comprised mainly of mines and Maritime Patrol Aircraft
(MPA)(see Figure 4).9 0 This defensive attitude was contrary
to the offensive principles of Mahan's battle fleet theory
and stifled naval power projection strategy.
Another problem with adopting the GIUK "Gap" mentality
is its "de facto" establishment of the battle line south of
Iceland, seemly creeding the Norwegian Sea and northern
Norway to the Soviets. This "omission" did not set well
with the Norwegian Ministry of Defense. Under Secretary
Lehman's strategy the lines were "redrawn" to include
northern Norway and the line became the Greenland-Iceland-
Norway "Gap."
9OPalmer, p. 82; and Eric Grove, NATO's Defense of the
North, p. 4.
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Herrick's Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and
Practice 91 and the writings of Admiral Gorshkov, some
individuals in the intelligence organizations began to
consider the Soviet Navy as mainly a defensive force. S2
This ran counter to prevailing opinions; why would the
Soviets build a large naval force if it were defensive in
nature? This logic did not fit the American perspective of
a large naval force.
Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) staff member James
McConnell, wrote in the first chapter of a 1977 draft of
Soviet Naval Diplomacy, the suggestion that the Soviet Union
would withhold its SSBN force in a nuclear exchange as a
second strike instrument.03 This could explain the build up
and the defensive nature of the Soviet Navy; a force for
protecting the sea based leg of their strategic nuclear
forces. (Refer to Table 2 for size of the North Fleet's
SSBN force.) This would mature into the concept of a
"Soviet SSBN Bastiuni" against which Allied attack submarines
91Rcbert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years
of Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1968)
92Hattendorf, pp. 11-12.
93Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell, eds., soviet
Naval Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979). This lead
to the "Bastion" theory prominent in the Lehman strategy.
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would be tasked under the final stage of the new strategy,
"Carrying the Fight to the Enemy". 94  By concentrating
Western SSNs against these forces, U.S. maritime strategist
hoped to gain an advantage in war termination. This
strategy was a restatement of the principles of Mahan that
called to seeking out and destroying the enemy's fleet.
Critics of the "Anti-Bastion" strategy have stated that it
was an escalatory campaign that would force the Soviet's
into a "use them or lost them mind set"9' 5 .
Almost simultaneously, two projects were developed
changing Navy long-range planning to assume an active role.
Sea Strike Strategy, developed by Admiral Thomas B. Hayward
as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was a counter to the
Carter Administration's Presidential Review Memorandum 10
94See: Weinland (Table 2); Barry R. Posen, (The U.S.
Military Response to Soviet Naval Developmerits in the High
North," The Military buildup of the High North, Sverre
Jervell and Kare Nyblom, eds. (Landam, MD: Center for
International Affairs Harvard University and University
Press of America, 1986), pp. 45-58; and Richard Halloran,
"Navy Trains to Battle Soviet Submarines in Arctic," New
Y TLimes, 19 May 1983, p. A17(W); for details on the
"Soviet SSBN Bastions". For information on the phases of
the Maritime Strategy refer to Watkins' article in the
"Maritime Supplement.
95Barry R. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation
and NATO's Northern Flank," Steven E. Miller, ed., Strategy
and Nuclear Deterrence, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1984), pp. 96-104; John J. Mearsheimer, "A Strategic
Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe,"
International Security (Fall 1986), pp. 46-48.
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(PRM-10) that called for a "Swing Strategy.''96  The Swing
Strategy envisioned the Pacific Fleet steaming to the
Atlantic in support of the Central Front. Hayward's
strategy, in light of the growing strength of the Soviet
Pacific Fleet, was to keep the U.S. Pacific fleet in the
area and concentrate his forces against Soviet forces there.
This "horizontal escalation" would open a second front and
relieve pressure on the Central Front.9 7  Additionally,
Hayward believed that without widening the conflict, the war
on the Central Front might be over before Pacific forces
could get there in support.
Seaplan 2000 was developed under the direction of
Secretary of the Navy, Graham Claytor, and Navy and Marine
Corps leadership. It called for a coalition strategy that:
(would] strive for superiority at sea against the
Soviets and, when examining the variety of possible
wartime operations against the Soviet Navy, think in
terms of forward, offensive operations as the most
effective means for employing the Navy to achieve the
Nation's broad defense policies.0 8
96Hattendorf, 10-11; and Hartmann and Wendzel, pp. 254-
5.
9
'7See ADM Thomas B. Hayward, "The Future of U.S.
Seapower," Proceedings/Naval Review (May 1979), pp. 66-71;




"Seaplan 2000" picked up the "Seastrike" theme of
opening a second front against the Soviets in the Pacific
and applied it to the Atlantic theater.
Admiral Hayward was given the chance to put into
practice his strategic views when he was appointed the 21st
Chief of Naval Operations in June 1978. Hayward quickly
began to develop a "selling strategy" for the Navy's global
strategy. He gave briefing to the military and civilian
leadership in the Pentagon and on the Hill. In an
unclassified version of his Naval Posture Statement to
Congress for 1979 published in the May 1979
Proceedings/Naval Review, he called for a global strategy
that was to become the Forward Maritime Strategy (FMS) of
the Reagan Administration. Hayward's selling strategy was
to move the debate on force structure from one that centered
on the budget to one that centered on strategic needs. 99 He
reasoned that if these needs were articulated skillfully to
Congress and the Administration, force level would be
commensurate.
9
"Ibid, pp. 13-14. Much of this section of the article
is based on Hattendorf interviewing Hayward at the Pentagon:
17 April 1985.
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Hayward focused instead on increasing the readiness of
the Navy by putting "his priority on spare parts,
ammunition, pay, and benefits." 00  To ensure that the Navy
would continue developing a coordinated strategy, Hayward
established the Strategic Studies Group (SSG) at the Naval
War College, which became the resource center for naval
strategy and war gaming. As fate would have it, events were
to assist implementation of Hayward's offensive strategy.
The overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the seizure of the
U.S. embassy in November 1979 and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan a month later, brought an end the era of
detente. The Carter Doctrine, a declaratory policy aimed
primarily at the Soviet Union following the Afghan invasion,
spelled out the vital interest of the United States in the
Persian Gulf; mainly access to Middle East oil, and the
lengths the United States would go protecting these
interest. In his January 1980 State of the Union address to
Congress, Carter stated:
An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on
the vital interest of the United States of America, and
such an assault will be repelled by any means
necessary, including military force. °0'
xOOIbid.
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As a means to put muscle behind the policy statement, the
Administration asked for and received an increased military
budget and developed the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
(RDJTF) for contingency operations.1 °2
Despite the warning nature of the doctrine, the failed
hostage rescue attempt caused many in Washington to question
the capability of the U.S. armed forces. These events, plus
a continuing economic crisis and the failure of the
Administration to form a "well-developed, coherent design or
consistent strategy" regarding the Soviet Union early on,
lead to the defeat of Carter in the 1980 presidential
campaign.1 ° 3  Thus, global events, the maturation of post-
war naval strategy and the election of Ronald Reagan to the
01°State of the Union address, 23 January 1980,
reproduced in U.S. President, Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter. 1980-81, book
I: 1 January-23 May 1980 (Washington, D.C.: GPO), 197; as
cited in Elizabeth D. Sherwood, Allies in Crisis (New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 148.
3-0 2 Sherwood, pp. 151-2.
3 03Craig and George, p. 143. Also refer to: Gaddis, pp.
349-52. Gaddis believes that the failure of the Carter
Administration was three fold: first, Carter's emphasis on
human rights and morality was at the expense of a realistic
foreign policy; second, "there was among the President's
advisers, no dominate theorist;" and third, Carter had the
misfortune of coming to office at a time when the Soviets
were expanding the challenges to the global balance of
power.
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Presidency set the stage for the "Forward Maritime Strategy"
of John Lehman.
Regardless what criticisms exist concerning John Lehman,
one thing that can not be denied is that he brought renewed
vigor to the naval forces debate when he assumed the Office
of Secretary of the Navy in February 1981. He and Casper
Weinberger were highly visible, articulate spokesmen for the
U.S. military during the first half of the Reagan
Administration. One of the cornerstones of the Reagan
security policy was the belief that if a conflict were to
break out between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact on the
Central Front, it would not be a short conventional war with
rapid escalation to a nuclear exchange.10 4  Reagan called
for a 1.6 trillion dollar defense authorization during the
1982-1986 period, the largest increase ever, to increase the
capabilities of U.S. conventional and strategic forces.1 0 5
The strategy that was implemented during the Reagan
Administration under Secretary of the Navy John Lehman is
possibly the most written on and debated military strategy
of the post war period.'0 6 While the purpose of this paper
'
04Hartmann and Wendzel, p. 261.
105Robert W. Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition
Defense," Foreign Affairs, (Summer 1983), p. 1128. The
majority of this was earmarked for conventional forces.
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is not to dissect this strategy, it is important to have a
working knowledge of the strategy and its consequences, not
only to the United States, but also to its NATO Allies.
Critics have accused Lehman of using the "Forward
Maritime Strategy" as a means for increasing the size of the
Navy's force structure with his repeated calls for a 600
ship Navy. An additional criticism has been that it did not
note the significance of the land campaign.1o7 That Lehman
used a declaratory policy for justifying force structure
should not be surprising to anyone; that is what SecNav is
suppose to do. As to the strategy being geared strictly
towards offensive strikes against the Soviet heartland, that
is as narrow-minded as the critics make Lehman out to be.
The land campaign and the maritime campaign were linked
Xo6Hattendorf, p. 25; and Peter M. Swartz, and Jan
Breemer with James Tritten, "The Maritime Strategy Debates:
A Guide to the Renaissance of U.S. Naval Strategic Thinking
in the 1980s," Naval Postgraduate School Technical Report
NPS-56-88-009, 1989. This is an expanded bibliography and
discussion of Captain Swartz's Maritime Supplement article.
(See footnote #25)
10 7Refer to Komer; ADM Stansfield Turner and CAPT George
Thibault, "Preparing for the Unexpected: The Need for a New
Strategy," Foreign Affairs (Fall 1983), pp. 123-135; and
Barry A. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War," International
Sur,11y (Fall 1982), pp. 28-54. The critics of the
maritime strategy have been collectively called the
"Continentalist," referring to their land oriented
strategical viewpoint. See Kennedy-Minott, pp. 13-16 for a
description.
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together. L 8  The operational plans (OP PLANS) and concepts
of operations (CONOPS) that would guide U.S. forces in a
European conflict are written to reflect this
realization.109
Admiral Watkins in the "Maritime Strategy Supplement,"
outlined the three phases of the FMS to be conducted in a
campaign against the Soviets. The first phase, Deterrence
or the Transition to War, called for American forces, after
Presidential authorization for mobilization, to surge to
forward positions to act as deterrence forces, or if
deterrence failed, to be in place for the transition to war.
The second phase, Seizing the Initiative, was to be an
aggressive anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare phase to
gain control of the operational area and allow unrestricted
use by Allied forces. The third phase has been discussed
briefly above in reference to the "Anti-Bastion" strategy,
but it also included conducting air strikes against key
shore targets and conducting amphibious operations to secure
I'0 Refer to Lehman's "The 600 Ship Navy" and Watkins'
"The Maritime Strategy," in the "Maritime Supplement."
1'0 The OP Plans and CONOPS are classified and therefore
can not be quoted in this paper, but if the reader has the
appropriate clearances, refer to OP Plans 2000 and 2200,
Commander Striking Fleet Concept of Operations, and
CINCNAVEASTLANT Concept of Operations.
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vital military terrain (i.e.; airfields, port facilities,
rail centers, communications centers, etc.)
The underlying principles of the Atlantic Maritime
Strategy can be outlined as:
1. To contain and destroy the Soviet Northern Fleet.
2. To deny the Soviets use of airfields in northern
Norway.
3. To assist in the defense of northern Norway.
4. To prevent the Soviets from conducting amphibious
operations against Norway. 110
The FMS became the focal point for components of the
U.S. Navy's planning and a programing policy. Having
coherent objectives gave the logistical and force planners a
benchmark for preparing programs that would meet strategic
goals. It presented a clear Navy-Marine Corps perspective
when testifying to Congress on defense matters and for
budget request. Most importantly, it allowed for public
debate on the strategy. The Navy had learned its lesson
regarding secretive strategies vis-a-vis the maritime policy
3 0Kennedy-Minott, p. 13; attributed to Vice Admiral
Henry C. Mustin,USN, ex-Commander of NATO Striking Fleet, at
a conference sponsored by the Naval Institute, cira 1986, no
reference given.
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devised by Admiral Sherman in the late 1940s. The
publication of the "Maritime Supplement" in £r ingc was
a clear public statement of policy, calling for a "Joint"
national defense policy based on the traditional might of
America, its maritime strength. Admiral Trost's article in
the same publication a year later, described the Essence of
the Maritime Strategy as:
[dealing] with the forces we have at our disposal
today. . . . it is a forward strategy, forward in the
sense of meeting our treaty obligations and other
commitments by operating away from our own shores. . .
[and] the strategy is operative worldwide.111
The debate on the Maritime Strategy was not confined to
the United States (or the Soviet Union). NATO member states
and other members of the Western alliance debated the policy
and its effects on tIeir security and economies.113 2 One of
the legacies of the Carter Administration, the elevation of
*1"ADM Carlisle A.H. Trost, "Looking Beyond the Maritime
Strategy," Proceedings (January 1987), pp. 15-6.
11 2Good sources on the European debates include: John C.
Ausland, Nordic Security and the Great Powers (Bolder, CO:
Westview Press, 1986); R.A. Bitzinger, "Denmark, Norway, and
NATO: Constraints and Challenges," Rand Corporation Note N-
3001-RC, November 1989); and William J. Taylor and Paul M.
Cole, ed., Nordic Defense: Comparative Decision Making.
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985). These are in
addition to Berner; Jensen; Jervell and Kare; Kennedy-
Minott; Jonsson; and Tunander, "Gray Zone".
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U.S. commitment to Southwest Asia to the same level as it
NATO commitment and the creation of RDJTF, caused concern
over the America's determination to defend Europe in what
was perceived as an upswing in the Cold-War rhetoric under
Reagan.''L3  The deployment of SS-20 intermediate range
missiles by the Soviets and the Reagan Administration's dual
track policy for developing and deploying a U.S. counter,
Pershing II and GLCMs, while at the same time seeking an
arms control agreement banning them, caused political
turmoil in Europe." 4  The Maritime Strategy became a means
to rally and unify NATO to a common programing and
operational plan.
One of the biggest questions for the European members of
NATO was what were the logistical and force requirements for
"l"Sherwood, pp. 150-160 and Komer, pp. 1125-8.
Although the RDJTF had no troops assigned to it on a
permanent basis, the Europeans (and the Japanese and Korean
as well) feared that if troops were required, they would be
pulled from NATO. Also, the decision to elevate the status
of Southwest Asia must made unilaterally by the Carter
Administration without consulting the NATO Council of
Ministers (NCM). Reagan's strengthening the RDJTF to a
Unified Command, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), caused
even more concern and the eventual South West Asia Impact
Study (SWAIS) that lead to increased biannual force goals.
Refer to Hartmann and Wendzel, pp. 259-60 for details of the
budgetary and force requirements of RDJTF.
"
4Komer, p. 1126. Anti-nuclear and anti-U.S. rallies
were common in European capitals during this period, putting
additional strains on the Alliance.
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the FMS? The force requirements were easier to address than
were the logistical requirements. The Military Committee
(MC) of NATO was able to develop operational requirements
based on force levels as part of its Defense Planning
Questionnaire (DPQ) and the development of the Tri-MC
Maritime Document. The logistics problem proved harder to
solve. First there was the question of what to stockpile?
Although NATO had been an alliance for over thirty years,
there is a great deal of diversity in equipment among the
members. Even though the logistics train could follow the
fleet, after the first days of the conflict, the expected
consumption and attrition rates would quickly exhaust the
onboard supplies and the long turn around times from the
United States to the Northern Flank were unacceptable.
Additionally, the logistics requirements for the Marine
amphibious units (MAUs) and the other units that would be
deployed required that supplies be prepositioned for quick
use. This is the success story of the Strategy, for the
alliance, in particularly the Norwegians and the British,
despite contested domestic debates, rose to the occasion and
developed a system of prepositioned stores and repair
facilities to buttress the FMS.xx 5
"'Kennedy-Minott, 22, 26, and 41; Watkins' 9; and
General P.X. Kelly, USMC, "The Amphibious Warfare Strategy,
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D. SUMMARY
The FMS has been the foundation of Alliance policy since
its general acceptance. It was generated from rediscovery
and refinement of the principles of Mahan. Its post World
War II evolution was rocky and tied to the political whims
of the succeeding Administrations. That is an accepted fact
of planning national and military policy in a democracy. It
took an expanding Soviet foreign policy and naval presence
to compel the civilian and military leadership into pro-
active planning. Along the way, many mistakes were made and
many lessons were learned which were applied in forming the
FMS.
The end of the Cold War however has brought the
leadership back to redefining its strategic policy. The
dissolution of Warsaw Pact alliance has removed the
monolithic threat that has been the focus of our planning
for forty five years and a freed Europe has brought with it
its own set of problems that threaten the NATO Alliance.
Third World petro-countries have established large standing
militaries that are well equipped. The question to be asked
now is: does the Navy's maritime strategy, as envisioned by
The Maritime Strategy Supplement," Peednag (January
1986), p. 25.
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its leadership, still provide guidance and basis for our
current and future maritime strategy in the Atlantic? If it
does not, then what lessons from the past can be applied in
formulating a new strategy? The next chapter will look at
the current discussion and planning that is taking place in
Washington and in Europe regarding the future of the
maritime strategy.
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IV. THE NORTH ATLANTIC MARITIME STRATEGY
AFTER THE COLD WAR
A. THE END OF THE COLD WAR
When the Berlin Wall was torn down in November 1989, the
most visible symbol of the Cold War period was destroyei. L16
The Western world proclaimed the triumph of capitalism over
Marxist-Leninist socialism, the victory of the free over the
oppressed, and the victory of "containment" over Soviet
expansionism. 17
In light of changes in East-West relations, Soviet
Minister of Defense, Army General Dmitri Yazov, addressed
the shift in Soviet military planning to "reasonable
sufficiency" stating that "in developing the theory and
practice of the art of war, we are guided by the concept of
a defensive strategy."118  The old, relatively stable, bi-
polar international system has given way to a multi-po]ar
116Although the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Korea
remains, it has never been quite the symbol of U.S.-Soviet
conflict as has been the Berlin Wall.
2 7 Colin Gray, "Tomorrow's Forecast: Warmer/Still
Cloudy," Proceedings/Naval Review (May 1990), p. 38; and
Thomas B. Grassey, "The New Deterrence," Proceedinas (June
1991), p. 32.
118As quoted in: Gray, "Tomorrow's Forecast," p. 38.
76
international system that, some analysts fear, will be less
stable, at least for the foreseeable future.
The "Wall" had symbolized the East-West division at the
core of military planning and spending for the superpowers
and their Allies for over forty years. The supposedly
monolithic Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization (WPTO) began to
fall apart as one after another the East European
"revolutions" of 1989 occurred.
The signing of the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE)
treaty in November 1990 signals a radical structural arms
reduction from the Atlantic to the Urals, with the WPTO
accepting larger cuts than NATO.-- 9  U.S. and West European
military and civilian strategist have been forced to review
their plans and polices regarding a confrontation with the
Warsaw Pact in Europe. If intelligence experts are to be
believed, the West will have up to two years of warning time
concerning a "future Europe-centered global war with the
13-9The WPTO cuts are mainly Soviet cuts since the WPTO
is no longer a military alliance. The asymmetrical cuts
that the Soviet negotiators agreed to under CFE have been at
the root of the military-right backlash in the Soviet Union
and have threatened to postpone or negate U.S. Senate
ratification of the treaty. For details on the treaty and
the differences in interpretation see: Michael R. Gordon,
"Outlook is Cloudy for an Arms Deal by U.S. and Soviets,"
New York Times, 6 February 1991, p. Al(W); and Andrew
Rosenthal, "A U.S.-Soviet Arms Dispute is Approaching
Resolution," New York Times, 23 May 1991, p. A8(W).
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USSR.'1 20 Given a reduced Soviet threat in Europe, is there
a need to continue stationing large, ready forces in Europe?
This question is particularly important to the U.S.
Navy. The Navy had developed its "Maritime Strategy" of
forward deploying forces close to the Soviet Union in times
of crises as a means of deterring war. If deterrence
failed, the Navy, acting unilaterally or in concert with its
Allies (principally NATO), would conduct conventional
maritime and amphibious operations on the Soviet flanks and
strike Soviet SSBNs in the "Bastions." This "horizontal
escalation" would presumably have forced the Soviets to
protect their flanks, in turn would relieving pressure on
the Central Front, long viewed as the key to any East-West
conflict.x2x The "600 ship navy" envisioned by ex-Secretary
of the Navy John Lehman had been planned around this
strategy and had provided a focus around which to center
naval planning and budgeting for both the United States and
its Allies.122 With the decrease in East-West tensions,
-
20James J. Tritten, "America's New National Security
Strategy," The Submarine Review (April 1991), p. 15.
X
2 1For details on U.S./NATO views of the Central Front's
past importance, both militarily and politically see "The
Maritime Strategy Supplement" Proceedings (January 1986),
and Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, Defending
America's Security, 2nd ed. (McClean, VA: Brassey's (US),
Inc., 1990), pp. 278-84.
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many leaders in Washington and Europe have called for a
reassessment of the Western military posture.1 2 3  The
"Lehman Maritime Strategy," although successful for its
time, is viewed as no longer valid in the new security
regime.-1 24
The demise of the Lehman strategy leaves NATO members
wondering what their security future holds. The Norwegians,
more than anyone else, are aware of the vulnerable
geostrategic position in which they find themselves. Much
of Norway's defense planning depends on an U.S./NATO
response in times of crisis.'2 5 Although CFE has reduced
L22Captain R.W. Barnet, "The Origin of the Maritime
Strategy," two parts, Naval Forces X (No. IV 1989), pp. 52-
57 and X (No. V 1989), pp. 58-62.; and Mearsheimer, "A
Stratecic Misstep," International Security (Fall 1986), pp.
3-57.
3 23"Text of the London Declaration of July 1990." The
Declaration calls for no first use of force by NATO and that
NATO members "solemnly state that we are no longer
adversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of
any state..." (Paragraph 6). The London Declaration has
become the guideline for restructuring NATO.
1 24"Meeting the Challenges of a Dynamic World: Naval
Policy for the 90's and Beyond," (A draft copy of brief to
CNO/CINCs Conference, October 1990), slide 11, notes states:
"The Maritime Strategy of the Cold War era is on the shelf
and ready for use if a global (read Soviet) threat re-
emerges." Also refer to Trost, "Maritime Strategy for the
1990s, 92; and Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
statement by Admiral F.B. Kelso. II. USN. Chief of Naval
ODerations. Posture and Fiscal Year 1992/1993 Budget of the
United States Navy. 102nd Cong., 21 February 1991, pp. 1-2.
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tensions on the Central Front, the Norwegians are rightly
concerned about the Soviet's continued buildup and
modernization of forces on the Kola Peninsula.-26 There is
increasing concern "over the expected reductions in the U.S.
Navy, and a possible shift in USN emphasis from the North
Atlantic to Third World contingencies.11227
B. UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGY FOR THE 1990S
When President Bush announced in a speech given at
Aspen, Colorado, that 25 percent cuts in the military would
occur by 1995, the world paid little attention. This would
have been highly unusual for cuts of such magnitude, but the
speech happened to coincide with the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait on 2 August 1990.12 8 The announced cuts, stimulated
-
25James Stark, "Norway," in Nordic Defense: Comparative
Decision Making, ed. William J. Taylor, Jr. and Paul M.
Cole, (Lexington MA: Lexington Books, 1985), pp. 91-126;
Kennedy-Minott, pp. 24-33; and Grove, ed. NATO's Defense of
the North.
261Ian Kemp, ed., Albert Jonsson, John Berg, and Johan
Rapp, contrib., "Politics of Change," Jane's Defense Weekly,
Special Report: Nordic Appraisal, (30 March 1991), p. 489.
327Ibid, p. 480; and Rear Admiral Rolf E. Pedersen,
Royal Norwegian Navy, "Norway's Coast is Clear," Proceedings
(March 1991), pp. 42-7.
128Refer to: Maureen Dowd, "Backing Pentagon, Bush Says
Military Can Be Cut 25% in 5 Years," New York Times, 3
August 1990, p. A13(W); Dan Balz, "Bush Sees 25% Cut in
Forces by 1995," Washington Post, 3 August 1990, p. A7; and
8o
by pressure from Congress to produce a "Peace Dividend,"
came after a year long internal Pentagon review of force
requirements conducted by General Colin Powell, chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Paul Wolfowitz, Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy.X 29
The plan calls for a new "slimmed down" defense strategy
based on the "end of the Cold War" and two years warning
time now believed available for indications of a resurgent
Soviet Union.130 Emphasis will shift towards responding to
regional crises that are considered vital to U.S. interest.
The new force structure envisioned is:
Army: 12 active, 2 reconstitutable reserve, and 6 other
reserve divisions reduced from the current 18 active and 10
reserve divisions
Air Force: 25 active and reserve tactical air wings down
for the current 36 total
Navy: 11-12 aircraft carriers down from 14 active
George Bush, "Remarks by the President to the Aspen
Institute Symposium," Aspen, Colorado, 2 August 1990 (The
White House: Office of the Press Secretary).
l29Michael R. Gordon, "New Pentagon Strategic Plan For a
World After Cold War"; "Despite War, Pentagon Plans Big
Cuts," and "Despite Pentagon Blueprint, Questions on
Spending Remain," New York Times, 2 August 1990, 3 February
and 5 February 1991, pp. Al(W), A4(W) and AI0(W).
x3oIbid.
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Marine Corps: 150,000 personnel down from 196,000
As part of the planned reduction, overseas and U.S.
basing would be reduced by closing or realigning
facilities. '3'
The pillars of the realigned structure are identified
as: continued modernization of our strategic forces; an
emphasis on research and development (R&D) to maintain the
United States technological edge; a focus on rapid response
capability; a premium on readiness and new roles for the
reserves; and a reconstitution policy to counter the
possibility of a renewed threat from the Soviets.-32
Secretary of Defense Cheney and others in the Pentagon
leadership have spelled out the goal of a smaller military
before numerous audiences, and spending cuts have been
incorporated into the 1992 defense budget request.'3 3  The
'
31Gordon, 2 August 1990. These numbers have changed
somewhat since the war and are sure to change again, but
they are a good approximation. For other figures see the 3
February article which notes among other figures; 451 ships
for the Navy and 26.5 air wings for the Air Force.
-
3 2 See Bush's Aspen Speech.
'133Refer to: Dick Cheney, "Remarks as Delivered by
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, International Institute
for Strategic Studies," The Homestead, Hot Springs, VA, 6
September 1990, and "Remarks By Secretary of Defense Dick
Cheney at Walsh Lecture," Georgetown University, Washington,
D.C., 21 March 1991, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Assistant
82
services have responded and have started developing budgets
and plans based on the reductions.134
A realignment of the Unified Command structure is seen
as one of the outcomes of the overall Defense Department
realignment. Although not firmly agreed to yet, the future
command structure as outlined by Pentagon spokesmen and
reported in the press calls for four major force commands;
an Atlantic Force, a Pacific Force, a Strategic Force, and a
Contingency Force. These will be supported with four
additional components; transportation, space, research and
development, and reconstitution.135
The Atlantic Force has been described as primarily a
heavy lift force capable of reacting to crises in Europe and
Secretary of Defense(Public Affairs); Colin Powell, "Remarks
by General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff," at the National Convention of the Veterans of
Foreign Wars, Baltimore, MD, 23 August 1990 (Washington,
D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff (Public Affairs); and George L.
Butler, "Speech by Director, Plans and Policy Directorate,
Joint Staff, to the Center for Defense Journalism," the
National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 27 September 1990
(Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff (Public Affairs).
'
34Refer to: Lawrence Garrett III, Frank B. Kelso, and
A.M. Gray, "The Way Ahead," Pro inU (April 1991), pp.
36-47; Carl E. Vuono, A Strategic Force for the 1990s and
Beyond (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S.
Army); and "The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global
Reach - Global Power," A White Paper dated June 1990.
135Michael R. Gordon, 2 August 1990; Nay Tim, p.
A18(W); and author's notes taken during "Admiral Charles M.
Cooke Conference-1991," Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
CA, 5-7 March 1991.
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the Middle East. Army units will include five active
divisions with two stationed in Europe, six reserve
divisions, and two "reconstitutable" divisions. Air Force
units will consist of five - six tactical fighter wings with
three - four wings stationed in Europe. The Navy will have
six carriers in the Atlantic command with one deployed to
the Mediterranean and the remainder of the force will
comprise of the historic even split of naval forces.1 M 6 The
Atlantic Force's heavy forces makeup reflects a persistent
U.S. concern about the future of Europe.
There has been an abundance of discussion regarding the
"new strategy," with many academics and strategist claiming
that it is not built on firm strategic foundations, but on
budgetary pressures. Some writers have gone as far as
saying that the Bush Administration lacks an orchestrated
policy.' ' In :he confused aftermath of the Cold War, the
political leadership has shirked its responsibilities for
providing clear guidance for our country's future. Although
x"Ibid.
137Michael Mandelbaum, "The Bush Foreign Policy,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1991, pp. 5-22; B. Thomas
Trout, "Changing Scenarios of Naval Force: The International
Political Context of Maritime Power," paper prepared for
delivery at the annual meeting of the International Studies
Association, Vancouver, B.C., 20 March 1991; and Grassey,
.3.
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such accusations might seem harsh given the difficulties of
changing forty years of bureaucratic inertia, they do point
to the need for a comprehensive review of the United States'
national interest and goals. Without an overarching "grand
strategy" that takes into consideration secondary and beyond
consequences of that strategy, it becomes virtually
pointless to plan lesser strategies; but, that is what the
Navy finds itself doing.
Another weakness of the new strategy that has received
criticism is the "reconstitution" of forces. Critics point
out that with the reduction in defense spending, the
industrial base that supported America's Cold War strategy
will have to be reduced. Industries such as shipbuilding,
tank manufac-.uring, and aircraft production will have to
shut down production lines or facilities that are no longer
profitable unless the government is willing to provide
subsidies.1 3
183 Tritten; Edward J. Campbell, "Industrial Base," and
James E. Turner, "Maintaining the U.S. Submarine Industrial
Base," Submarine Review (April 1991), pp. 27-31 and pp. 32-
36.
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C. U.S. NAVAL STRATEGY FOR THE 1990s
The U.S. Navy finds itself in a position much like that
of the immediate post World War II era. In this case
however, the opponent's military strength is still intact.
The "Lehman Maritime Strategy" that defined naval missions
for the 1980s, no longer carries the day when Congress is
lobbied for Navy's share of the budget despite testimony
presented by the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) on the
continuing modernization of the Soviet Navy. -39
Given the guidelines laid out by the Secretary of
Defense, Navy leadership has scrambled to develop a post
Lehman strategy. "The Way Ahead" article published in U.S.
Naval Institute Proceeding, April 1991, is an unclassified
articulation of the Navy's "new strategy." Authored by the
Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and
the Commandant of the Marine Corps, it uses the President's
Aspen Speech outline for future U.S. defense policy and
DNI's assessment of future threats as benchmarks to match
Navy's missions to policy. The needed force structure,
still centered on the carrier battle group, is defined as a
139Congress, House, Committee on Intelligence Issues,
subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials,
Statement(s) of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks. USN. Director
of Naval Intelligence, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 22 February
1989; 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., 14 March 1990, and 102nd
Cong., 1st Sess., 7 March 1991.
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"balanced total force of about 450 active and reserve ships,
plus three active and one reserve Marine division/wing team
(Marine expeditionary forces)." 04  The goals outlined in
the article are not new to naval professionals and show
their heritage from the Lehman strategy. This should not be
a surprise, since the "Maritime Strategy" was meant to be an
evolving strategy.
According to an article by John F. Morton, in the 1991
Proceedings/Naval Review:
Four key components of the new naval policy are
shaping the current wave of reductions -- surge forces
for rapid reaction to any crisis, forward-deployed
expeditionary forces capable of going anywhere (with
full logistic, medical, and repair support), a sea-
based maritime pre-positioned force, and sea-based
strategic forces for deterrence.'4
The one glaring shift in the new strategy is the
statement by Secretary Garrett in his 1992-93 Congressional
policy statement that anti-submarine warfare is "no longer
the Navy's number warfighting priority."1 142 The emphasis is
now placed on power projection and control of the SLOCs to
14Garrett, p. 45.
4'John F. Morton, "The Navy in 1990," Proceedings/Naval
Review (May 1991), p. 124.
X42Ibid.
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deal with regional contingencies.- 4 3  The power projection
role will require a ready and robust Navy-Marine team, as
exemplified by Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The
rapid response by Navy and Marine forces in early August is
credited with deterring the Iraqi Army from invading Saudi
Arabia. -4 4
Overseas basing and overflights are of increasing
concern for the Navy. The new strategy stresses "forward
presence" as a deterring factor and that without adequate
forward basing, the strategy is without teeth. United
States access to foreign basing has been steadily declining
and must be reversed."6 The new strategy also requires
changes in the employment and deployment of naval forces.
Given the reduced numbers of naval vessels available in the
next decade, and the possibility of growing regional threats
to U.S. interest, innovative mixes of forces will be
required to meet these contingencies. The key to solving
many of these problems rest in maintaining and building new
sets of alliances.
"43Author's notes from "Cooke Conference-l29i" and
Morton, p. 125.
44Eric Schmitt, "Swarzkopf Praises Navy, and Teamwork,
for Gulf Role," New York Times, 31 May 1991, p. A16(W).
"4See James L. George, "A Strategy in the Navy's Best
Interest," Proceedings/Naval Review, (May 1991), p. 118.
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D. EUROPE'S ROLE IN THE NEW STRATEGY
On October 3, 1990, the same day Germany was united,
General John Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
(SACEUR), "rescinded the General Defense Plan, NATO Document
14/3, the Western mobilization plans to meet a surprise
attack from the East." 14,6 With the agreement worked out at
the "Four plus Two" talks on the unification of Germany,
and the July 1990 London Conference, the old East-West
demarcation line centered on the Fulda Gap, ceased to exist.
The future of NATO's role in European security began to be
questioned.
One of the results of the London Conference is the
restructuring of the NATO alliance. At the NATO ministerial
meeting held in Brussels, the week of 27 May 1991, a
streamlined NATO force was announced. As reported in the
New York Times, 29 May 1991, the new NATO will "prepare for
small crises instead of (a WPTO] assault from the East," and
U.S. force levels will be reduced by 50 percent by the end
146"NATO Still Split on Future Doctrine, Threat," Der
Spieg~, p. 15 October 1990), trans. FBIS-WEU-90-218, (9
November 1990), p. 1. The article goes on to discuss the
end of NATO's Flexible Response policy and the need to
revamp Europe's security needs.
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of the decade.247  Forces will be centered on a "Rapid
Reaction Force" that could respond in 5-7 days and will
include .iultinational troops.14
Western Eu opean nations have been discussing the need
for a change to the Alliance for some time, calling for a
new European security fram-work.149  The 35 member
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),
esta lished in 1975, has been discussed as a possible forum
for addressing European security concerns. Its advantage is
that it already includes both the United States and Canada
as members. Critics co the CSCE proposal point out that the
size of the Conference is its weakness, pointing to the
difficulties NATO's sixteen members have had in reaching
agreement on defense issues.150 Additionally, each memb'-
2.4 7Paul L. Montgomery, "NATO is Planning to Cut U.S.
Forces in Europe by 50%," New York Times, 29 May 1991, p.
AI(W).
148 Ibid.
14 9Refer to: Grassey, p. 32; Peter Stanford, "NATO Must
Go," Proceedings (March 1991), pp. 36-40; Johan Jorgen
Holst, "Changing Northern European Views on Security and
Arms Control," Naval War College Review (Spring 1990), pp.
85-103; "Norway's Security in a New Era," N rwegian Defense
Review, Status of Norwegian Defense 1991 (Speciai Issue),
pp. 6-11; and Francis West (former U.S. Assistant Secretary
of Defense) as quoted in Ola Tunander, Cold Water Politics,
pp. 47-49.
' °0Stanford, p. 39. and Holst, "Status of Norwegian
Defense."
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of the Conference has one equal vote. This is a weakness
that stronger member nations, such as the United States
object.'51
Another alliance that has been discussed as the
foundation from which to build a European security
arrangement is the West European Union (WEU) under whose
umbrella a multinational task force operated in the Arabian
Gulf in 1988 and 1991.252 The WEU was established in 1954
as a European security union separate from NATO and it has
"provided essential political cover" for members to conduct
out of area military operations.'5 3 The WEU has the support
of France. Its major strength is that members are not
prevented from conducting out of area operations in support
of European interest as is NATO. Its major draw back is
that it does not include the United States or Canada in the
alliance.
It appears, for the time being, that a "revamped" NATO
will be the alliance that will oversee Atlantic security
interest through the decade of the 1990s. The French-German
initiative to form a European security arrangement seems to
151Stanford, p. 39.
'




on hold for now, but the question of French involvement in a
common European security agreement remains and must be
resolved.'54
The Brussels Ministerial meeting of May 1991 dealt
mainly with revision of land based components of NATO's
force structure. Little was reported in the press
concerning NATO's maritime component. Two possible
explanations exist regarding this oversight. One, it was
just an oversight; that NATO, in the public eye, as been
viewed as a continental alliance of mainly land based forces
and that the proposed 50 percent reduction is across the
board, or two, no firm plans exist for restructuring NATO's
maritime forces. Hopefully, the latter explanation is
incorrect.
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), Admiral
L.A. Edney, in a presentation to a closed session of NATO's
Military Committee (MC) 11-12 April 1991, detailed a new
maritime structure that is based on guidelines of the London
Conference. I5 5  It calls for developing two core
1S4Montgomery. The article notes the attempt by France,
with German support, pushed for a new security structure to
replace NATO.
.
55Memorandum for Facsimile titled, "Tri-NMC Concepts
and Rationale for Future Maritime Force Structures," dated 1
April 1991, (Norfolk, VA: Headquarters, Supreme Allied
Commander, Atlantic); compiled from notes taken by author
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Multinational Maritime Forces (MNMF) that are akin to
Standing Naval Forces Atlantic (SNFL) with one in the
Mediterranean and one in the Atlantic.156 Its maritime
tasks, as outlined by SACLANT, are consistent with the
policy outlined by Secretary Garrett in "The Way Ahead"
article:






1. Support the Air/Land Battle
2. Reinforce existing forces ashore
3. Establish a beachhead on hostile shores
during SACLANT interview with Captain. Fitch, USN, (C-72),
10 April 1991.
156The MNMF is envisioned as being a staged force
structure consisting of three forces. First: Reaction
Forces, subdivided into Immediate Reaction Forces responding
in less than 48 hours comprised of Destroyers (DD), Frigates
(FF), Ocean Mine Sweepers (MSO) and Mine Counter Measures
(MCM) vessels as well as support units; and Rapid Reaction
Forces responding in less than 96 hours, subdivided into:
NATO Task Groups (NTGS) comprised of Cruisers (CG), DDs,
FFs, MSOs, MCMs, and submarines, both nuclear and
conventional(SSN/Ks); and NATO Task Forces (NTFS) comprised
of a NTGS plus a carrier battle group (CVBG) augmented by a
Marine Amphibious Group (HAG) if required; and a NATO
Expanded Task Force (NETFS) comprised of a NTFS plus a full
amphibious landing force. The second force is the Main
Defense Maritime Force which mirrors the NETFS. It would
respond within 15-30 days and be use in the most severe
crisis level short of full mobilization. The third force
would be Augmentation Forces which would comprise of vessels
that could not be activated in less than 30 days, but could
be used in a prolonged crisis. Compiled from author's
SACLANT notes.
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4. Provide a base for further operations if
required
- Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
- Provide a base for further operations if
required3'5
Although the readiness of the force structure has
changed, reflecting relaxed East-West tensions and increased
warning times, the "revamped" goals appear to be much like
those of the "old" Tri-NATO Major Command (Tri-NMC) Concept
of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS), NATO's version of the
Lehman strategy.'58  CONMAROPS is still in effect for NATO
warfighting as of this writing, but like the Lehman maritime
strategy, is considered unlikely to be used, and "on the
shelf. ,'Is9
The concept outlined by Admiral Edney presupposes that
the naval forces of NATO will be reduced, but that all
members will adopt "reconstitution" policies akin to those
of the United States.'6 0  This is understood to mean that
active force levels will remain sufficient to meet the
operational requirements of NATO. Previous discussion has
157SACLANT facsimile.
15OGrove, NATO's Defense of the North, pp. 4-6. Grove
provides an UNCLAS overview of the Tri-NMC CONMAROPS.
'
59Fitch SACLANT interview, 10 April 1991.
16OIbid.
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shown that there is considerable concern in the United
States about the ability to reconstitute forces given the
current budget problems. As will be seen, there exist some
serious concerns about the ability of NATO's Northern
European members, Norway and Denmark, to sustain forces.
This problem also extends to non-members, Sweden and
Finland, and increases concern over the future security of
NATO's Northern Flank.
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E. THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF SCANDINAVIA'S ABILITY TO
CONTRIBUTE TO ITS DEFENSE
As the decade of the 1990s progresses, the ability of
the Scandinavian countries to contribute to the defense of
the region will icreasingly come into question. Due to
budgetary difficulties, peace initiatives, arms control
proposals, etc., these nations will have to reevaluate their
defense policies and, in most cases, reduce the capabilities
and/or size of their armed forces.'6'
Iceland is perhaps the least affected at this point by
the changes that have taken place in past few years. Since
it does not maintain a military force, questions concerning
'L6 -1Numerous articles in the Scandivanian and U.S. press
have been appeared in the past several years discussing the
future ability of the region to provide for its security
needs. For a general overview refer to the following: Johan
J. Holst, " Changing Northern European Views on Security and
Arms Control," and Count Wilhelm Wachtmeister, "Neutrality
and International Order," Naval War College Review (Spring
1990), pp. 85-114; Rear Admiral Rolf E. Pedersen, Royal
Norwegian Navy, "Norway's Coast is Clear," and Rear Admiral
Claes Tornberg, Royal Swedish Navy, "Meeting the Submarine
Threat," PrQcedingq (March 1991), pp. 42-50; Commodore I.
Olav Kjetun, "Is There a Place for the Coastal Artillery in
Our Future Invasion Defense?" Norsk Artilleri-Tidsskrift
(No.2, 1988), trans. FBIS-WEU-89-007, 11 January 1989, pp.
43-7; Werner Christie, "Nordic Countries Between the
Superpowers," enpo ten, 15 December 1988, p. 14, trans.
FBIS-WEU-89-031, 16 February 1989, p. 29; Olav Storvik,
"Holst: Army a Reform Problem," and Unattributred report:
"Holst: Defense Growth is Good!" Aftenposten, 28 February
1989, p. 4, and 7 March 1989, p. 8, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-079,
26 April 1989, pp. 21-2; editorial, "A Defense Compromise,"
and Terkel Svensson, "Defense Bill Point by Point,"
Berlinske Tidende, 9 March 1989, p. 12, and 10 March 1989,
p. 4, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-069, 12 April 1989.
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military budgets are confined to civil defense and NATO
construction projects that take place in Iceland. 16 2
Iceland however, does have much at stake with regard to its
security future. It depends almost entirely on the United
States for its military security.163 The decrease in Soviet
naval and air activity (See Table 4) since the late 1980s
has caused the United States to take a close look at its
force structure there.1 6 4  SACLANT has dropped its proposal
for establishment of an alternate airfield in Iceland
although a one billion dollar NATO infrastructure
modernization and building program has continued as
planned.' ,6 5




3The Netherlands maintains 1 aircraft detachment at
Keflavik and other NATO countries periodically send
detachments, but the bulk of the Iceland Defense Force is
American.
164The U.S. Navy is exploring the possibility of
reducing the size of the P-3 force stationed in Iceland.
An internal decision made in 1989, reduced the size of the
squadron deployed there to 8 aircraft vice the 9 that had
been the norm. There exist the possibility that by late
1991-early 1992, Keflavik might become "Split deployment
site" with half of a P-3 squadron deployed there and the
other half deployed to Lajes, the Azores. (Information from
author's interview with Captain Jim Arnold, Commander Task
Force 84, Air ASW shop, Norfolk, VA, 9 April 1991.)
65Jonsson, Jane's Defense Weekly, pp. 495-8.
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CHART 1: NUMBERS OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT INTERCEPTED IN THE
ICELANDIC MILITARY AIR DEFENSE IDENTIFICATION ZONE
(IMADIZ) 1985-1990. (Sources: Albert Jonsson, Iceland
NATO and the Keflavik Base, 54 and Jane's Defence
Ieekl, Nordic Appraisal, (30 March 1991), 495.)
Regardless of the changes that have taken place in East-
West relations, Iceland will continue to play a vital role
in the defense and reinforcement of Northern Europe. For
the time being at least, Iceland's main concern is to
maintain a U.S. presence on the island through strong
bilateral relations.166
16'Ibid, p. 494. Jonsson sees Iceland's role growing as
U.S. troop strength in Europe is reduced; and in Iceland and
the Keflavik Base, p. 100, states: "Defending Norway could
not be counted on without forces in Iceland."
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Denmark's military future is less certain than
Iceland's. In March 1989, after months of debate, the
national assembly, the Folketing, reached a compromise on a
three year defense budget. The bill proposed a zero growth
rate, adjusted for inflation, and appropriations that
included three percent per year NATO infrastructure
funding.'6' Under the bill, the Army's tank force would be
upgraded by purchasing used Leopard tanks from Germany,
modernizing some of their older tanks, and retiring others.
The Navy planned to get four additional "Standard Flex"
ships, modernization of two of their submarines, and
scrapping of the remaining frigates. The latter's firepower
will be replaced by two landbased surface-to-surface missile
batteries to protect the vital Danish straits (the Skagerrak
and the Kattegat). Additionally, a shipyard would be
closed, and Copenhagen Naval Station changed from a homeport
to a port of call. The Danish Air Force is to acquire
ammunition and electronic identification equipment worth 600
million Danish Kroner ($0.78 million in 1989 dollars). The
unused military facilities are to be sold and the money
acquired used for further defense spending.1 68  The loss of
'
67Terkel Svensson, "Defense Bill Point by Point,"
ferlingske Tidende, 10 March 1989, p. 4, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-
069, 12 April 1989, pp. 13-14.
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the shipyard at Holmen is a blow for both Denmark's and
NATO's ability to accomplish battle damage repair in the
Baltic.
NATO/U.S. access to bases in Greenland has been reduced
with the decision to shutdown the DEW Line station at Sonder
Stromfjord in southern Greenland.'69  Areas of Greenland's
east coast were considered for the alternate North Atlantic
airfield, but as already pointed out, SACLANT decided not to
pursue construction. This leaves Thule as the only military
base on the island and its future is in question. There is
strong political pressure by the Greenlanders to establish a
"nuclear free zone" in Greenland and U.S. evacuation of
Thule.170 There is also a strong independence movement in
Greenland.
Sweden, long the premier military power in the Nordic
region, is facing formidable security problems due to severe
economic problems.'7' The 1992 defense budget has been
'
6 sIbid. Under Danish law, the military buys from the
government and when surplus or salvaged property is sold by
the military, the funds raised are military funds.
169Unattributed article: "Announcement: Bigger Danish
Role in Greenland's Defense and U.S. Base Cuts?"
Gronlandsposten, 21 November 1988, p. 10, trans. FBIS-WEU-
89-015, 25 January 1989, pp. 33-4.
170 Ibid and Editorial, "Military Bases,"
Gronlandsposten, 4 November 1988, p. 8, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-
015, 25 January 1989, p. 33.
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lowered by 0.3 billion Swedish Kroner from the 1991 budget
(approximately $0.2 billion in 1989 dollars).' 72  As a
result, "the military has said that either Sweden's defence
goals must be redefined or the armed forces substantially
modernized.", 73
The Swedish Air Force desperately needs a new
interceptor to replace its aging fighter fleet. Swedish air
power in the 1950s and 1960s "was about the same size and
strength as that of Great Britain, France, and West
Germany," but has been in steady decline since then.T 74 The
JAS 39 Gripen fighter program has been beset by cost
overruns and delays as well as heated debate in the national
assembly about Sweden's overtaxing itself on the project.,75
The Gripen is needed to counter the latest generation of
'
7 1Jane's Defense Weekly: Nordic Appraisal, pp. 491-3;
Dick Ljungberg, "Greens Criticize Defense Policy, Saying
'Vulnerability is Only Increasing," and Goran Schuck,
"Schori Warns Of Weak Defense," Dagens Nyheter, 9 December
1988, p. 17, and 30 January 1989, p. 2, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-
053(Supplement), 21 March 1989, p. 97.
1 7 2Jane's Defense Weekly: Nordic Appraisal, p. 493.
.
73Ibid, p. 491.
"74Wilhelm Agrell, "Trovardigheten raseras" [Credibility
is Undetermined], Ny Teknik (Stockholm), 25 August 1988, as
quoted in Tunande-, Cold Water Politics, p. 125.
17sWerner Christie, "Nordic Countries Between the
Superpowers," Aftenpostgn, 15 December 1988, p. 14, trans.
FBIS-WEU-89-031, 16 February 1989, p. 29-30.
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Soviet tactical aircraft which can reach all parts of Sweden
without refueling and with very little advanced warning if
coming from the Baltic, and the Soviet Union's newest
helicopters can also reach most of the country unrefueled,
thus increasing Sweden's vulnerability to airborne invasion
threats from the East."76
Submarine sightings in Swedish territorial waters have
continued despite reduced superpower tensions.2 77 Swedish
naval and political officials have been frustrated over the
failure to halt these excursions into "sensitive areas.' 1 78
The Swedes have established a "submarine hunting force" in
an attempt to address the issue and have began development
of "CAPTOR" [encapsulated torpedo] type mines as a
counter.2 9  The Swedish submarine force, perhaps the best
17sIbid.
'17 Refer to Tornberg article in Proceedin-g. Rear
Admiral Tornberg admits that Sweden's ASW forces have not
preformed well, citing the difficulties of conducting these
operations in the Baltic and in shallow water, but says
Sweden is intensifying its R&D efforts and that the rules of
engagement have be relaxed to allow a more aggressive hunt.
-1-Ibid, and Rodger Magnergard, "Foreign Submarine in
the Inner Archipelago for Over a Week," Svenska Dagbladet, 5
February 1989, p. 6, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-028, 13 February
1989, p. 17. Tunander, in Cold Water Politics, p. 119,
cites Milton Leitenberg and Gordon McCormick as believing
that the Swedes have "more or less consciously let Soviet
submarines escape" to avoid another international incident.
S79Ibid, and Rear Admiral Tornberg, p. 49.
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ASW weapon system available, has decreased in size. Its
fleet of six Type 90 SSKs has been reduced to only three. I80
The Swedish Army has reduced its size from 28 brigades
to 21 over recent years as a means to reduce military
expenditures. This level is the minimum considered
necessary by Swedish Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials to
carry out the current defense plan which has shifted away
from a prolonged defense of the country to an anti-invasion
force with its main strength along the Baltic coast.'81
Given the geography of northern Sweden and present funding
difficulties, this probably makes good defensive sense for
Sweden, but it reduces the security of the area closest to
Norway, further shifting the military balance of the region
in favor of the Soviet Union.
Manpower in the Swedish armed forces is suffering from
the same budgetary problems. This will be further
aggravated by a MOD proposal to reduce conscript training
from 10 months to 2.5 months. The Swedish parliament,
believing that national service is a requirement for living
in a democracy, compromised and limited initial service for
some conscripts to 5 months.'82  Some military leaders
'
80Tornberg, p. 50.
1'8 Jane's Defense Weekly: Nordic Appraisal, pp. 492-3.
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question the shortened length of service, believing that its
is not long enough to adequately acquire the skills
necessary for modern warfare.18 3  The requirement for
conscript crew changes in the 1988 submarine hunt is cited
by Swedish Navy official as one of the reasons for its
failure.x8 4
The Swedish arms industry is suffering as well. Most of
the Swedish military's equipment is domestically produced.
As already discussed, the JAS 39 project has proven to be
very costly. Designing and manufacturing modern combat
aircraft is very expensive. This is one of the reasons that
the European members of NATO have produced multinational
fighters such as the Tornado and the Jaguar, to spread the
research and development and manufacturing cost. This may
point to the future of Sweden's aircraft industry if an
export market can not be found for its designs. However,
Sweden's restrictive arms export laws will hinder sales
efforts on aircraft and other armaments.'8




-4See untitled article by Bengt Flakkloo in D
Nyheter, 3 February 1989, p. 12, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-035, 23
rebruary 1989, p. 54.
3-85In 1987, seven Western powers, lead by the United
States, joined together to halt sales of high technology
equipment and chemical that could be used to produce mass
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Finland is in the process of reassessing its defense
posture. The Four plus Two agreement that restored full
sovereignty to Germany is seen by many in Finland as the
opportunity for rescinding the terms of the 1947 Paris
Treaty, which placed limits on the armed forces and conceded
Karelia to the Soviet Union, as well as the YYA [Friendship,
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Treaty] with the Soviet
Union are no longer valid.'8 5 This perhaps signals the
beginning of a "less neutral" relationship with the West
than was possible earlier.
Finnish defense spending has been quite low in the past,
approximately 1.5 percent of the GNP. 18 7  Future defense
spending has been much debated in the national assembly.
destruction weapons. These countries applied political
pressure on the Swedish government to tighten up its export
laws. Refer to untitled article by Bo G. Andersson, in
Dagens Nyheter, 17 February 1989. trans. FBIS-WEU-89-053
(Supplement), 21 March 1989, p. 101.
3'8Refer to Editorial, "Finland Reaps Harvest, Too," and
unattributed article "Jakobson Would Let YYA[Friendship,
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Treaty] Be; Karelia Comes
Up in Discussion Again," Helsingin Sanomat, 22 September
1990, p. 2 and p. 9, trans. FBIS-WEU-90-213, 2 November
1990, p. 26.
187Matti Klimola, "Is Finland Becoming a Model for
Disarmament for Europe?; l0-Billion-Markka Fighter Plane
Proposal Opens Debate on National Defense," Helsingin
Sanomat, 15 January 1989, pp. Bl-B2, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-053
(Supplement), 21 March 1989, p. 61. This figure varies
between 1.5% to around 5.0% depending on who's figure one
wants to believe. In the same article, these figures were
also quoted.
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Finnish Air Force officials would like to replace aging
Draken and MiG-21 aircraft with newer generation aircraft of
Soviet, Swedish or French design by the mid-1990s at an
estimate cost of 6-9 million markkas($1.3-$2.0 billion in
1989 dollars), but they face tough opposition for
funding. -8
Norway, like the other Scandinavian countries, has had
to face budgetary problems that have effected the military.
Norway, however, is caught in a geostrategic bind between
the superpowers. The present government in power supports
Norway's role in NATO and recognizes it important geographic
position. It also is concerned about the continuing Soviet
military buildup on the Kola peninsula despite the apparent
East-West thaw. Minister of Defense Johan Holst recently
expressed concern over the Soviet Union's "redesignation" of
the 77th Guards Motor Rifle Division in Archangelsk to a
"coastal defense unit," in what is interpreted as a
violation of the spirit of CFE. "B9  Politicians are
beginning to have second thoughts about the 1991 "zero
18OUnattributed article, "Harri Holkeri Wants Combat
Fighter Equipment Replaced Despite Price; Valtanen Angered
by Talk of Armament," Helsingin Sanomat, 17 January 1989, p.
13, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-53 (Supplement), 21 March 1989, p.
64.
289 Jane's Defense Weekly: Nordic Appraisal, p. 480.
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growth" defense budget, and the Conservative Party, which
introduced the proposal while in power, has called for the
Labor Party to reinstate the 3 percent growth budget that
had been in place earlier.190
The Norwegian Army, the most powerful of the three
services, will be slightly reduced in numbers of tanks and
artillery to meet CFE requirements, but will modernize its
remaining units. It is also facing manpower cuts as a
result of the "zero growth" budget and will have to disband
or combine some of its forces. According to Admiral Torolf
Rein, Norway's Chief of Defense:
• last year's levels of refresher training for army
mobilization (wartime) units, ship availability in the
navy, flying hours in the air force and Home Guard
exercises will be maintained. These activities are
already considered to be at the minimum level for
effective operations and reductions will be avoided by
transferring funds freed by a limited cut in some
readiness measures, cuts in initial military service
and streamlining training. Norway's surveillance and
warning capabilities will not be reduced.19 1
The Norwegian Air Force is presently in good shape by
domestic accounts. The upgrading in the 1980s with F-16




maritime patrol aircraft with P-3C Update IVs, and the
modernization of its helicopter fleet with Bell 412 SPs has
maintained the service as a credible deterrent force.392
Current plans call for performing mid-life extension
programs on the F-16s in the mid-1990s which will keep these
aircraft functional well into the next decade, but the
decline in Swedish airpower will place additional strains on
Norway's air defenses.
The Norwegian Navy has also felt the effects of the
budget squeeze. Motor torpedo boats (MTB) have had to be
retired from service because of age and lack of funding.-'9
This has spread the remaining MTBs thin, causing a
reassignment of assets to cover strategic points in the
north, but leaving weaker defenses in the south. Although
Danish and German assets, if available, could quickly deploy
to cover these areas, adequate warning time is essential.
The loss of the MTBs is partially offset by construction of
four new mine hunters and five new mine sweepers utilizing
"surface effect" technology which will enhance Norway's
vital NATO role of clearing inner passage SLOCs.- 94
."
2 Ibid, p. 482.
'
9 3Pedersen, p. 47. and an untitled article by Olav
Trygge Storvik, Aftenposten, 15 December 1988, p. 4, trans.
FBIS-WEU-89-023, 6 February 1989, pp. 42-3.
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The Coastal Artillery, considered part of Norway's naval
anti-invasion force, is in need of repair. Much of its
equipment dates back to the Second World War and was
installed by the German occupation forces. Repair of fixed
gun emplacements has become impossible in some cases because
of age and unavailability of parts.'95 Efforts to modernize
the force with surface-to-surface missiles are meeting with
limited success at this time.
Norway's recognition of its vital position between the
superpowers has resulted in a defense force that is
presently well equipped to handle its primary mission, anti-
invasion, but the current "zero growth" defense spending
will take its toll over the next few years. Hopefully, the
end of the Cold War will allow Norway and the rest of
Scandinavia to maintain a defense program that matches the
"reduced" threat, but U.S. planners should be aware that,
given the present circumstances, the defense and
reconstitution capability of the region is questionable and
must be considered in any calculus of the United States'
reconstitution planning.
19 4Jane's Defense Weekly: Nordic Appraisal, p. 487.
195See Kjetun article.
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F. OTHER CURRENT ISSUES THAT MIGHT EFFECT NORDIC-U.S.-
U.S.S.R. RELATIONS
In addition to the security and economic issues
discussed so far, at least two other issues of importance
face Scandinavia; its future relationship to the European
Community; and the influx of refugees fleeing from the
Baltic States and the Soviet Union as a result of the lift
of travel restrictions in the Soviet Union. Perhaps the
hardest question facing the Nordic countries is that of
their future relationship to the European Community (EC).
Currently Denmark is the only member. Sweden and Finland
have both made overtures to join the Community. In Sweden's
case, joining is seen as the means recover from its economic
crisis. The EC is making plans to open an office in
Helsinki in 1991, to better coordinate its ties with the
Nordic countries. This has been viewed as an in-road to
Finland's joining.196 The issue of joining the EC has been
hotly debated in Norway. The general view of Norwegian
politicians had been that if Sweden asked to join, so would
Norway. The Norwegian trade unions, and industry and
commerce have expressed a general desire to join, but in the
1@6Unattributted article, "EC Office in Finland May Open
in 1991," Helsingin Sanomat, 30 August t990, p. 11, trans.
FBIS-WEU-90-213, 2 November 1990, p. 32. Finnish political
leaders have tried to slow down joining EC, claiming the
economic infrastructure needs time to adjust before joining.
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past year, there has been a grass-roots backlash against
Norway's joining.197 Iceland's Althing has discussed
joining, but is reluctant, fearing that its traditional
fishing industry would suffer and the free immigration laws
of EC would have an adverse effect on the Icelandic customs
and lifestyle. 19 8
The political and security instability in the Baltic
caused by the breakdown of the Soviet Empire and future
lifting of travel restrictions in the Soviet Union are other
factors that might cause an uncertain future for
Scandinavia. It is somewhat ironic that the United State
applied much of the political and economic pressure on the
Soviets to allow free movement of Soviet citizens.199 The
"refugee problem" ties in with the question of membership in
'19 7Author's interview with Captain Hallin, Royal
Norwegian Navy, Naval Attache, Norwegian Embassy,
Washington, D.C., 11 April 1991. Norwegian farmers and
fishermen view the joining of the EC as an end to their way
of life. Also see: Tidningarnas Telegrambyra dispatch,
"Norway Will Do as Sweden Does," Dagens Nyheter, 28 October
1990, p. 16, trans. FBIS-WEU-90-213; and Jane's Defense
Weekly: Nordic Appraisal, p. 482.
369 0Author's interview with LCDR Pam McNaught, USN,
Assistant Department Head, OP-614, Pentagon, Washington,
D.C.,ll April 1991.
'099Refer to Esther B. Fein, "Soviets Enact Law Freeing
Migration and Trips Abroad," and R.W. Apple, Jr., "U.S.
Lauds Moscow on Emigration Law," New York Times, 21 May
1991, p. Al(W) and p. A4(W).
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the EC. When (if) "Europe '92" comes to fruition on
December 31, 1992, there will be no travel restriction
between member countries. This has produced a "xenophobia"
with the prospect of masses of refugees in Western Europe
leaving Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.200 By November
1990, Finland had already witnessed a 25 percent increase in
the issuance of tourist visas to Soviet citizens from the
Leningrad and Kola regions over the previous year, and
Denmark granted political asylum to 89 Soviet refugees in
1990, an marked increase from the 9 granted the year
before.2 0 - Western European officials have already labeled
the refugee problem as the "big issue of this decade" and
that "a wave of several million migrants should be expected
in the coming years."'20 2
Scandinavian countries have taken a dim view of the
force that the Soviet Union has used in the Baltics to
repress independence movements. There have been repeated
calls by several Nordic assembles for the Soviets to forsake
the use of force there and to allow the Baltic States to
200 See Alan Riding, "West Europe Braces for Migrant Wave
From East," New York Times, 14 December 1990, p. A6(W)
2ciJulian Isherwood, "Finns Braced for Soviet Influx,"
Daily Telegraph, 22 October 1990, p. 11, as cited in FBIS-
WEU-90-213-A, 2 November 1990, p. 19.
20 2Riding.
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pursue their independence.20 Continued pressure on the
Soviets by Norway and Sweden has caused diplomatic strains
recently. President Gorbachev, speaking in Stockholm with
Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson stated that
"[c]ompassion by a neighboring country must not take the
form of meddling in the affairs of the Soviet Union,
especially when it is in the process of reform. . .. To
support separatism and oppress minorities is not
acceptable" 20 4  Carlsson appeared to reject Gorbachev's
remarks, stating, ". . . Sweden had historical and cultural
ties with the Baltic States."20 5
The Baltic issue is one which the United States has so
far treated with care, trying to walk a diplomatic tightrope
to avoid confrontation with the Soviets and upsetting the
new found nature of trust and Gorbachev's reforms. This
tactic might backfire with regard to European opinion.20 6
20 3William E. Schmidt, "Gorbachev, in Oslo, Links World
Peace to Perestroika," New York Times, 6 June 1991, p.
A6(W); and Interview with E.A. Shevardnadze conducted by
NUtrias Kontakt correspondent: "E.A. Shevardnadze's Answers
to Questions Posed by the Northern Council's Journal,"
Nutrias Kontakt," trans. JPRS-UIA-90-013-L, 26 December
1990, p. 6.
2o4Unattributed Associated Press article, "West Told not





Planning for the future security needs of the United
States has never been more important than at this time.
Unlike past periods, the post Cold War period lacks a
vanquished opponent. The Soviet Union, although
experiencing a multitude of internal problems, still
possesses the largest military force in Europe and is the
only nation capable of destroying the United States within a
matter of hours. Third World threats, seeking to establish
themselves as power brokers capable of altering the regional
balance of power for their own designs, exist throughout the
world. Additionally, the terrorist threat and the "war on
drugs" will compete for U.S. naval assets in the coming
decade. The naval planner must look for lessons learned
from the successes of the past and apply them toward a
future naval strategy as part of America's national
strategy. More importantly, the planner must be aware of
the threats to America's "vital interest."'20 7
20 6See editorial, Flora Lewis, "The Next Soviet
Challenge," New York Times, 6 February 1991, p. A19(W).
207Hartmann and Wendzel, p. 44; defines vital interest
as "worth going to war or the serious risk of war." Gray,
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At first glance there appears to be an attempt by the
United States and its West European partners to develop a
comprehensive and cohesive defense strategy. There are many
potential pitfalls along the way however. The first and
foremost question on any planner's mind should be the future
of the Soviet Union. The supposition that it will become a
responsible member of the world community and that Soviet
military reductions mandated under CFE and START treaties,
will be realized, are at the heart of Western defense
planning. The West must maintain a close watch for a
resurgent Soviet military and for changes on the political
scene that would indicate a return to the days of the Cold
War. This will place a major burden on Western intelligence
agencies. The two year warning window is necessary for the
"reconstitution" of Western forces. The West will need to
maintain the industrial base required of this policy and the
indications of its doing so are not heartening.208 This
also places increased pressure on Western political
leadership to recognize, accept and take action against
increasing or resurgent threats.
p. 40; uses the term "survival interest" meaning nuclear
deterrence, which he deems more important.
20 OSee Tritten, Campbell, and Turner.
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U.S. economic and trade interest is shifting. Already
United States' trading with Pacific Rim countries exceeds
that of Europe by 30 percent.20 9  This will inevitability
result in a shift of regional interest for the U.S. The
Persian Gulf will continue to be an area that will require
America's attention for the foreseeable future. The
countering interest between Europe and other regions will
force tough decisions on planners in the next decade,
especially as U.S. troop strength is brought down in Europe
and Europe continues to push for more autonomy in its
security affairs.
The "Lehman Maritime Strategy" may be "on the shelf,"
but the strategic importance of the Northern Flank region
has not decreased. If anything, its importance has
increased. As long as the Soviet Unions possesses a sea-
based nuclear capability homeported mainly in the Kola, the
United States will have an interest in the region. The
Norwegians, sharing a common border with the Soviets, also
will share that interest, regardless of the tensions of the
time. It behooves both the United States and Norway to
maintain a close alliance for their mutual interest.
2 0 9Grassey, p. 32.
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The naval requirements for future uncertainties will
require a mobile, flexible force mix. To borrow from
Captain Wayne Hughes: "The only certainty about our navy's
wartime role is the uncertainty of predicting in peacetime
what site, enemy and mission will be involved."2 20
2 1oWayne P. Huqes, Jr., Fleet Tactics: Theory and
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